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ABSTRACT

Twelve conference papers address four educational themes. Three papers on intellectual life in the school deal with the philosophy of George S. Counts; the nature, purpose, and value of liberal education; and educational consequences of the idea of reason. Four papers on educational alternatives treat the educational philosophy of Ivan Illich, hermeneutics and paideia, the basic ingredients of alternative education, and mainstream education for older adults. Two papers on school administration address organizational theory as educational philosophy and accountability and responsibility. On the theme of John Dewey, two articles discuss the philosopher's theory of inquiry and his views on war and the League of Nations. An additional paper on philosophy for everyone, the conference presidential address, is included. (LP)

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

1982

November 12-13, 1982

Edited

by

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University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

and

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ANNUAL CONFERENCE

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY

OF EDUCATION

SOCIETY

CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 12-13, 1982

Wayne State University

Detroit, Michigan

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements i

Program iii

George S. Counts On Indoctrination
by Lawrence Dennis 1
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

The Nature, Purpose, and Value of Liberal Education
by Linda F. and David B. Annis 14
Ball State University

The Evolution of the Idea of Reason and Its Educational Consequence
by Philip L. Smith 29
Ohio State University

Ivan Illich on Education: Epimetheus Unbound?
by Timothy Reagan 41
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Hermeneutics and Paideia
by Robert Hollinger 55
Iowa State University

A Basic Ingredient of Alternative Education: A Blend of Philosophies
by Pat Montgomery 65
Clonlara School
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Presidential Address: Philosophy for Everyone?
by George A. Kizer 87
Iowa State University

Mainstream Education for Older People: A Philosophical Justification
by June Sark Heinrich 103
Triton College
River Grove, Illinois

Organizational Theory As An Exercise In Philosophy of Education
by W. Hal Knight and Carles E. Litz 120
Kansas State University

Accountability and Responsibility: Some Fundamental Differences
by Robert Paul Craig 133
St. Mary's College
Orchard Lake, Michigan

Dewey's Theory of Inquiry Revisited: The Bain Connection
by Frank McBride 141
Wayne State University

John Dewey on War and the League of Nations
by Carl Cohen 156
University of Michigan

Officers 170

Acknowledgments

The Proceedings of the Mid-West Philosophy of Education Society have been published since 1977. The Society itself has held annual conferences for over twenty years. This year's Proceedings stands a documentation, not only for an outstanding yearly meeting, but more importantly it serves to identify the excellent philosophical inquiry being accomplished by its membership.

Special thanks are in order for Alex Makedon and the members of his Program Committee for a fantastic conference, obviously the result of rigorous screening and careful planning. Kudos also to Arthur Brown and Wayne State University for their magnanimous hospitality. With respect to the Conference itself, the participants deserve acknowledgment; that is, beyond the presentations those in attendance, who listened attentively and asked carefully thought out questions made the affair successful.

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Michael C. Smith

Jack Williams

ANNUAL CONFERENCE

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

November 12-13, 1982
Wayne State University

Program

Friday, November 12, 1982

12:00		Welcoming Remarks: Edward Simpkins, Dean College of Education

I. INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN SCHOOLS

Moderator: John DeWitt

"George S. Counts on Indoctrination"	Lawrence Dennis Southern Illinois University
"The Nature, Purpose, and Value of Liberal Education"	Linda F. and David B. Annis Ball State University
"The Evolution of the Idea of Reason and Its Educational Consequence"	Philip L. Smith Ohio State Univelrsity

2:45 Intermission

II. EDUCATIONAL ALTERNATIVES

Moderator: Craig Schley

"Ivan Illich On Education: Epimetheus Unbound?"	Timothy Reagan University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
"Hermeneutics and Paideia"	Robert Hollinger Iowa State University
"A Basic Ingredient of Alternative Education: A Blend of Philosophies	Pat Mortgomery Clonlara School Ann Arbor, Michigan

5:10 Cocktail Hour

7:00 Dinner at McGregor

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Moderator: Arthur Brown

"Philosophy for Everyone?" — George A. Kizer, Iowa State University

Respondent: — Alex Makedon, St. Nicholas School, Detroit, Michigan

Saturday, November 13, 1982

II. EDUCATIONAL ALTERNATIVES (cont'd)

Moderator: Craig Schley

"Mainstream Education for Older People: A Philosophical Justification" — June Sark Heinrich, Triton College, Oak Park, Illinois

III. SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

Moderator: Rick Morshead

"Organizational Theory As An Exercise In Philosophy of Education" — W. Hal Knight and Charles E. Litz, Kansas State University

"Accountability and Responsibility: Some Fundamental Differences" — Robert Paul Craig, St. Mary's College, Orchard Lake, Michigan

11:30 Lunch Break

IV. JOHN DEWEY'S CONTRIBUTION

Moderator: Marianne Glazek

"Dewey's Theory of Inquiry Revisited: The Bain Connection" — Frank McBride, Wayne State University

"John Dewey on War and the League of Nations"		Carl Cohen University of Michigan

3:00 Business Meeting

4:00 Adjournment

GEORGE S. COUNTS ON INDOCTRINATION

by
Lawrence J. Dennis
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

I was particularly pleased last spring to learn that our Program Committee had this year made every effort to get away from the dotting of "i"s and the crossing of "t"s which occupied this body so insistently when I last attended these meetings with some regularity. Maybe the state of our "field," and indeed of all the cultural foundations of education, is forcing us to sully our hands by touching things both urgent and real. Being of an activist disposition myself I applaud our engagement here in such discussions as our Committee has arranged. They are sorely needed during this time when we are facing the critical and perhaps even life and death issues of nuclear warfare, of the extensive and probably irrevocable destruction of our habitat, of the continued consumption of never-to-be-replaced natural capital, of the economic colonialism of multinational corporations that exceeds beyond measure former forms of colonialism which were at least transparently obvious, of the clamor of small nations and states against ruthless exploitation, of our own growing isolation from the rest of the world, of an economic order whose sickness seems to be beyond remedy, of a crumbling welfare system whose benefits accrue to badly run companies and to those from whom the crumbs are supposed to trickle, of the rise of various forms of superstitions and hocus-pocus and the corresponding sleep of reason, of an inability to discriminate between the commonplace and what is fine in art, music, and literature, and of the substitution of a many-voiced and omni-present cacaphony for the proverbial still small voice. So we have been invited to consider such issues. We have

also been encouraged--I can hardly believe it--to read the work of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, and even that of Alvin Toffler, and to compare it with the work of earlier theorists. And--can I say it without offense?--it's about time too.

I thought, then, as my main research focus in recent years has been on the work of George S. Counts, that I would lay out for you Counts's views on INDOCTRINATION, for they do bear on the issues I've just mentioned. Counts's views are now more or less exactly 50 years old, and I well recognize that too much can be made of the similarities between the state of affairs during the early 1930s and those of the early 1980s. However, Counts challenged his readers and listeners then to take social action--social action that should be a progressive response to the social realities of the age. For him, the overwhelming social reality, from which most of the others flowed, was the gigantic shift of western society from an agrarian order to an industrial/technological order. He knew that his own life, which began in rural Kansas in 1889, spanned a great watershed in human history; Toffler and others now assert that that second wave has been overtaken by a third. Counts, seeing the effects of the second wave, called for a new education based on a new social order. It was a social order that required, among other things, national and international planning and cooperation, that demanded a new conception of general welfare and human rights, that recognized the implications of instant world-wide communication (which Counts used to say had once again reduced this planet to the size of the mythical Garden of Eden), that acknowledged and dealt with the race that Soviet Russia was engaged in to surpass America. Of course, the list is much longer. Counts was disappointed

that the education community in large part failed to face the issues occasioned by an industrial society as, I think that Toffler would agree, it still fails to face the issues of an information (post-industrial or electronic or whatever) society. But it appears that a group of us here is making an effort to confront some of these issues, and it might be helpful if I explore with you now George S. Counts's concept of indoctrination, which will, I trust, be not simply a philosophical abstraction, but a small spur to action.

"Our generation has been so thoroughly indoctrinated with the idea that indoctrination is always an evil thing that we all feel ourselves in the presence of a moral outrage when we see the word coupled with education."[1] So wrote George Counts in 1932. I suspect that the word still stirs similar response, for it carries the odor or propaganda, of something that facists or communists or religious cults do, and often do very successfully. Indoctrination is an activity that most of us freedom-loving westerners despise. We do not indoctrinate, we provide choice. We do not indoctrinate, we educate. That most children in this country turn out to be little Americans merely reinforces our objectivity, for left to choose we know that students always choose wisely. Counts liked to recall a 1927 conversation he had with a Russian Commissar of Education, who also found indoctrination distasteful. "When I asked him," says Counts, "whether the Soviet children did not become good communists. . .he replied that the great majority did. On seeking from him an explanation of this remarkable phenomenon he said that they merely told their children the truth about human history. As a

consequence, all of the more intelligent boys and girls. . .adopted the philosophy of communism."[2]

Before I continue, let me give you some idea of Counts' use of the term "indoctrination." I nearly said "Counts' definition of the term," but he was not that precise, for he was not a philosopher in any formal sense, although philosophy was one of his specialties as an undergraduate at Baker University. He took no philosophy courses at graduate school, even though he had the opportunity while at the University of Chicago to study with both Mead and Tufts. He was trained as a social scientist, and was the first person to graduate from the University of Chicago with a doctorate in education and a concentration in sociology. He did study there with such giants as Frederick Starr, W.I. Thomas, Albion W. Small, and Charles E. Merriam, and largely through their influence, developed something of a social philosophy. This may not have been apparent during his student days, but in the early '30s his major professor, Charles Hubbard Judd, chided him for forsaking the science of education for the more treacherous arena of speculation. "My only advice to you is don't become a philosopher so long as you are young enough to make valuable contributions to factual knowledge . . . . Philosophy is too easy; beware of the enticements of this kind of thinking."[3]

Back to Counts and his use of "indoctrination." Keep in mind that Counts had something of the provocateur about him. In the early 1930s, fresh from his second and longest visit to Russia, he loved to use red rhetoric--so that we encounter such words as "collectivism" and "the masses," as well as writings about a Five-Year Plan for America. Indoctrination was of such a hue, and in using the word I am sure he intended to bring forth a strong

reaction. However, if one digs just a little it is apparent that by indoctrination Counts did not mean to imply the teaching of dogma as fixed and final, and, as you will notice, he sometimes slipped into the use of the substitute word "imposition." "It is quite possible" he wrote, "that indoctrination is too strong and uncompromising a word to apply to the kind of influence which I have in mind. Perhaps imposition is better; but even this term should be made to carry its milder connotations."[4] This clarification is, however, a mere footnote, and such soft-pedalling was not typical of Counts, who preferred a polemical posture which would provoke a response.

Among many objections to Counts's use of indoctrination was one offered by John Dewey. Dewey noted that indoctrination typically was characteristic of facists and communists for whom the outcomes were quite specific. Dewey felt that the process to which Counts referred really gave American children the option to focus on a number of traditions--conservative, liberal, progressive. This made it for Dewey different from the indoctrination of the "isms." "If the result is called indoctrination," said Dewey, "it is at least a self-correcting indoctrination."[5] But Counts did not intend quite such a flexible interpretation of his ideas. He readily admitted that some tradition would be imposed, but, asserted that teachers perforce would have to select the particular tradition. For Counts the preferred choice was "the ideal of democratic collectivism."[6] Counts had a social agenda, and he believed that teachers did also. Whether teachers knew it or stated it, they <u>acted</u> a social program. And Counts believed profoundly that teachers not only did but <u>should</u> propound a social, and probably also an economic program if they were to serve the best interests of students and society. He specifically called for "an

education that recognizes the impossibility of moving in all directions at once, that chooses deliberately and intelligently one fork of the road rather than another, and that does not hesitate. . .to make fundamental decisions regarding national destiny."[7] As this quote implies, Counts had in mind a fairly precise social program appropriate for the emerging age (which he was always alert to point out was an age in transition), and that to accomplish it, that which was to be indoctrinated should not be left to chance, tradition, personal whim, or local will.

One of the most platitudinous statements one hears over and over again from teachers (I hear it from my own students until they learn better) is that they don't take sides; they remain neutral, present all the facts on controversial issues, and let the students make up their own minds. This is, and Counts thought so too, a lot of poppy-cock. As he wrote in 1935, "It is not essential to make a detailed study of the history of American education to discover that the school has always aimed not only at the dissemination of neutral factual knowledge and the mastery of so-called tool subjects, but also at the inculcation of attitudes, values, beliefs, loyalties, and ideals."[8] Counts recognized that those who propounded the neutralist approach, and he especially berated the progressives for this, tended to be more concerned with method than with content. As one protagonist wrote in response to Counts's expressed views: "progressive schools teach neither capitalism nor communism primarily--they teach the child."[9] This view, Counts states, "is utterly untenable"[10] because education is not essentially a question of method but <u>a question of politics</u>. Counts readily acknowledged that the child must "be taken into account in the organization of any educational program, but it

cannot furnish the materials and the guiding principles of that program." He adds, pertinently as far as my present discussion is concerned, "And, squirm and wriggle as much as we please, we must admit that the bringing of materials and guiding principles from the outside involves the molding of the child"[11] (my italics). So, if neutrality is not possible, it seemed to Counts that indoctrination must be inevitable.

The word indoctrinate might still offend you, but, notes Counts, the child is indoctrinated from the moment he or she is born. "The child is terribly imposed upon by being compelled thru the accidents of birth to learn one language rather than another."[12] The notion to which I have already referred that education should be impartial is, Counts believed, simply an educational fallacy. Not only, of course, do the requirements of the culture demand that we indoctrinate, but "[i]t is obvious that the whole of creation cannot be brought into the school. This means that some selection must be made of teachers, curriculums, architecture, methods of teaching. And in the making of the selection the dice must always be weighted in favor of this or that . . . . [T]his means the stacking of the cards in favor of the particular systems of value which we or our society may happen to possess."[13] Even towards the end of his career Counts maintained much the same posture:

> We must realise that whenever choices are made in the launching of a program values are involved. This is obviously true in the shaping of the curriculum, the selection of textbooks, the giving of grades, the organization of social activities, the construction of a school building, the hanging of pictures and paintings on the walls of a schoolroom, and in the selection of a teacher.

He adds:

> I have often told my students that, if we want to avoid imposing anything on our children, we should alter the architectural style of the building every day. Also I call their attention to the fact that our arithmetic textbooks transmit to the younger generation countless social, political, and moral ideas--for the most part a white middle-class culture.[14]

The point that even arithmetic books transmit values was not lost on the values clarification bunch. In the early '70s I attended a week-end values clarification workshop--it was great fun. The leader in one of the sections dealing with math was, I think, Howie Kirschenbaum. He explained that one could even encounter values in a math class. (That would not have surprised George Counts.) We did a math exercise; sure enough, the topic of the Viet Nam War cropped up. At the conclusion of the clarification exercise we all concurred that the War was a terrible thing. As much as I agreed with that conclusion I forced my hand up to inquire what he would have done had the group or some of its members concluded that the war was a good thing. "Why, give them some more exercises," was Kirschenbaum's reply! In spite of his vaunted neutrality he was not ready to admit what Counts well knew, that neutrality was not possible. But for Counts, neither was it desirable. That is another fallacy. As he writes,

> I am prepared to defend the thesis that all education contains a large element of imposition, that in the very nature of the case this is inevitable, that the existence and evolution of society depend upon it, that it is consequently eminently desirable, and that the frank acceptance of this fact by the educator is a major professional obligation.[15]

And here Counts takes the next step by asserting that it is the <u>obligation</u> of teachers to indoctrinate. Acceding for a moment that neutrality might be <u>theoretically</u> possible, Counts asserts that neutrality is "tantamount to giving support to the forces of conservatism."[16] This was unthinkable to a reconstructionist like Counts, who went so far as to call the progressives to

account for being afraid of "the bogies of imposition and indoctrination."[17] "I cannot think," he is reported to have said, "of an educational program that does not involve imposition on the mind of he who is being educated."[18]

Counts was, of course, appalled by the forces of conservatism, which, he saw clearly, dominated the schools. After all, he had written three books in the 1920s, the results of which influenced him for the rest of his life. These results showed that schools and teachers were controlled by the powerful, and that the children of the powerful benefit most by participation.[19] He reported in the late 1960s that the results a student of his found then in the Southern Illinois area were little different from these he had found forty years earlier. However, Counts felt that one reason we are so afraid of indoctrination is that we are as a profession (and by extension probably now as a society) guided by no strong ideal.

> We are able to contemplate the universe and find that all is vanity. Nothing really stirs us, unless it be that the bath water is cold, the toast burnt, or the elevator not running. Perhaps this is the reason why we are so fearful of indoctrination. We are moved by no great faiths; we are touched by no great passions. We can view a world rushing rapidly towards collapse with no more concern than the outcome of a horse race; we can see injustices, crime, and misery in its most terrible forms all about us and, if we are not directly affected, register the emotions of a scientist studying white rats in a laboratory. And in the name of freedom, science, and the open mind, we would transmit this general attitude towards life to our children.[20]

It was this disengagement that Counts deplored so much. And, it was his hope that the teachers of the nation would be able to foster social commitment, in fact to indoctrinate their students into the absolute centrality of that commitment. What he wanted to see indoctrinated was "a vision of what America might become in the industrial age."[21] The future is

not pre-determined. We can, and to believe else is an alternative I dare not contemplate, play a part in shaping that future. In fact, if we let the present sail into the future there may well be, as Jonathan Schell presents with potent clarity in his recent book The Fate of the Earth (Knopf 1982), no future to shape. Yet Counts well realized that the school is not an all-powerful educational agency, and that many forces (perhaps even more in number and potency now than when Counts addressed this issue in the 1930s) are brought to bear upon young people. Dewey, too, realized that school was not an allpowerful educational agency. But he maintained that while school "is not a sufficient condition, it is a necessary condition of forming the understanding and the dispositions that are required to maintain a genuinely changed social order."[22] Counts would essentially agree. Schools by no means have a monopoly on indoctrination. Counts recognized that "the real question is not whether imposition will take place. . .but rather from what source imposition will come."[23] This is where the teachers, as a large and reasonably well-respected body of public servants, fill his particular purpose. I interpret it as a sad commentary on our profession that while Schell talks about the absolute necessity of knowledge, he does not once suggest that schools and teachers play a role in disseminating that knowledge. I have to suppose that Counts would still place his trust in the schools, but I wonder sometimes with what degree of hope. He pinned his faith on the emergence of the collective power of teachers, through their unions and through organizations such as Progressive Education Association, to insist on a greater degree of professionalism. Remember that I said earlier that Counts viewed education as primarily a matter of politics. This was not mere

ideological wishful thinking, and he himself entered the political fray when he assumed the presidency of the AFT during some of its most critical years--1939-1942. That was the period when the union was threatened by communist infiltration and when the country faced total war. Sadly, Counts may well have come to feel that the unions themselves are now moved by no great faiths or touched by no great passions.

You might assert that this talk about indoctrination is all very well, but that it is the job of teachers to teach the truth. I do not surely need to linger on this topic (especially among a group of so many truth experts), but let me remind you that Counts's Russian friend, the Commissar of Education, also taught the truth. Counts noted that the Methodist sect, in whose bosom he was raised, taught the truth. No, it seems an inescapable conclusion to me, as it did for Counts, that we indoctrinate. The issue then is what do we indoctrinate and toward what ends? Is it to support the social, political, and economic status quo, or is it according to some idea of human progress, or indeed to some idea of human regress? In order to decide our agenda we must try, says Counts, to see our time, together with all its present and emerging social realities, as clearly and as objectively as possible. Then we indoctrinate according to the social necessities which emerge. This, as I see it, is what this particular conference is about, and it is here that educational philosophy, at its best, can illuminate those unknown paths that lie ahead of us and even more of the rising generation.

Footnotes

[1]George S. Counts, "Education thru Indoctrination," Official Report, Department of Superintendence of the NEA (1932): 193.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Charles H. Judd to George S. Counts, 23 June 1930. Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago.

[4]Counts, "Education thru Indoctrination," p. 194.

[5]John Dewey, "Discussion," in "Freedom, Culture, Social Planning, and Leadership." (Washington, D.C.: National Council of Education of the NEA, 1932), p. 14.

[6]George S. Counts, Social Foundations of Education (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), pp. 248-49.

[7]Ibid., p. 535.

[8]The Editors, "Introductory Remarks on Indoctrination," Social Frontier 1 (January 1935): 8.

[9]Augusta Alpert, "Education and Indoctrination." Letter to New Republic 72 (31 August 1932): 75.

[10]George S. Counts, "Education and Indoctrination." Letter to New Republic 72 (31 August 1932): 75.

[11]Counts, "Education thru Indoctrination," p. 195.

[12]Ibid., 194.

[13]Ibid., 196.

[14]George S. Counts, "Should the Teacher Always Be Neutral?" Phi Delta Kappan 51 (December 1969): 188.

[15]Counts, "Education thru Indoctrination," p. 194.

[16]George S. Counts, Dare the School Build a New Social Order? (New York: John Day Co., 1932), p. 54.

[17]Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[18]Transcript of the meeting of the Commission for the Social Studies in the Schools of the American Historical Association held at Chicago on 13 October 1933, 9:00 a.m., p. 18 (typescript).

[19]George S. Counts, The Selective Character of American Secondary Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922); and The Social Composition of Boards of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927); and School and Society in Chicago (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1928).

[20]Counts, "Education thru Indoctrination," p. 197.

[21]Counts, Dare the School, p. 54.

[22]John Dewey, "Education and Social Change," Social Frontier 3 (May 1937); 237.

[23]Counts, "Education thru Indoctrination," p. 197.

THE NATURE, PURPOSE, AND VALUE OF LIBERAL EDUCATION

Linda R. Annis
David B. Annis
Ball State University

I

The debate over the nature, purpose, and value of liberal education arose more than two thousand years ago. According to the classical view, which derives from Aristotle (Politics, Bk. VIII), liberal education:

(1) is not vocational in nature,

(2) requires general education as opposed to narrow specialization,

(3) is intrinsically valuable,

(4) seeks to develop rational abilities and traits.

Vocational education is designed primarily to provide people with specific knowledge and skills for doing a certain job. Thus law schools, medical schools, and secretarial schools all provide vocational education. Liberal education may provide a person with specific skills for doing a certain job but it is not primarily designed to do this.[1]

Traditionally liberal education has been viewed as liberating education and education befitting a free person.[2] If we consider liberal education in a free society, we can see why it requires general education, that is the acquisition of a variety of skills as well as study in a number of different areas. To be socially free is not merely to be able to do what one wants to do. If we could determine a person's desires, then even though the person might be able to do what he or she "wanted" to do, we would not call the person free. To be free also requires the opportunity to develop a variety of wants, to desire certain alternatives.[3] But developing alernative desires

requires diversity of experience and a broad background of knowledge. Liberal education in part seeks to provide this.

Furthermore, as Sidney Hook and others have argued, in order for a person to participate rationally in the solution of the broad spectrum of problems facing a free society, the person must possess a variety of skills and have a wide range of information.[4] Consider some of the problems facing us today: inflation, fuel and food shortages, overpopulation, and pollution. Participating in the solution of these problems requires people who can read write, speak, and think effectively, and who understand the basic physical, social, moral, political and economic issues involved in the problems. Liberal education attempts to provide such skills and understanding.

The third condition of the classical characterization of liberal education is important for it concerns the justification of this kind of education. Why is liberal education important? The classical answer has been that it is intrinsically valuable. It is valuable because pursuing it is rewarding in itself. Although we do not doubt this, what we wish to maintain is that at least in part what makes liberal education important is that it develops certain (a) knowledge and understanding, (b) rational skills, and (c) attitudes, traits, and values.

We can find no better summary of the goals of liberal education than a recent statement by the President of Princeton University. According to President Bowen, a liberal education ought to help us

> gain a basic knowledge of the human condition, the societies human beings have created, and the physical world we inhabit--a knowledge that is both historical as well as contemporary, that includes an appreication for language and cultures other than one's own, that reflects some rigorous understanding of the principles and methods of modern science, ... It ought to serve a genuinely "liberating" function--it should help to foster

a critical independence and to free us from our own forms of slavery, from the parochialisms of our own time and place and station. It should help us to develop those habits of thought which always ask why, which believe in evidence, which welcome new ideas, which seek to understand the perspectives of others, which accept complexity and grapple with it, which admit error, and which pursue truth, wherever it may lead, however uncomfortable it may be. It should help us to be compassionate and sensitive human beings, of service to others. It should help us to develop, and then demonstrate a concern for ultimate values that are more than superficial signposts and that reflect more than the role repetition of someone else's formula for living a good life.[5]

II

In what follows we shall restrict our discussion basically to the role of the humanities in liberal education. We shall briefly list some of the main goals of the humanities component of liberal education, and then discuss a few of them in more detail. Some of the most important of these goals include:

(1) To improve one's understanding of one's own culture and heritage and the cultures of other people, without which one cannot be considered "educated."

(2) To improve one's ability to think critically. This includes determining whether a set of premises provides adequate support for a conclusion, being able to identify fallacious reasoning, revealing hidden assumptions, anticipating objections and a variety of other skills.

(3) To improve one's communication skills. This includes being able to clearly and succintly express the main point of an argument or issue, being able to identify and avoid vagueness and ambiguity, being able to carefully develop, organize, and explain your points.

(4) to make one more intellectually independent and creative. This includes being able to develop your own criticisms of arguments and positions, being able to construct your own arguments for your positions, and being able to produce your own solution to a problem.

(5) To make one more open-minded and less dogmatic, more tolerant of the views of other people, more willing to reflect on issues from a number of different perspectives, more intellectually curious, more receptive to new ideas, and more willing to change our beliefs in the face of new evidence.

(6) To make one more tolerant of uncertainty and the lack of easy solutions to complex issues.

(7) To instill a healthy skepticism so one does not accept a claim until adequate evidence is produced.

(8) To acquaint students with basic moral concepts, principles, and theories, and to apply these to moral issues in order to help students become more sensitive to moral problems and moral reasoning.

A number of important contemporary studies on liberal education agree that these are important goals of liberal education.[6]

III

Consider the goal of improving a person's ability to think critically. Both students and faculty rate this as an important goal of education.[7] One immediate difficulty is that of defining critical thinking. A review of the literature reveals several issues. First, some researchers have viewed critical thinking as a single monolithic ability (as intelligence was viewed), while others have treated it as composed of a number of general abilities. The latter is the view that prevails now. But there still is the problem of identifying the abilities involved. Although there has been considerable overlap in the lists of suggested abilities such as identifying central issues, recognizing underlying assumptions, evaluating evidence, and drawing warranted conclusions, there still exists differences of opinion, and further research needs to be done.[8]

A second issue in the literature has been whether the abilities involved in critical thinking are context-specific. Investigators have tended to assume that if critical thinking consists of such abilities as identifying central issues, evaluating evidence and so on, then these abilities would transfer from one context to another. Recently, however, it has been argued that critical reasoning in the sciences or specific areas within the sciences may not be the same ability as critical reasoning in the humanities. Instead

critical reasoning involves highly specific capacities where there is little transfer of training.[9] Hence there are no general rational abilities at which liberal education can aim.

There are several replies. First, even if it were true that critical reasoning in the humanities is different from critical reasoning in the sciences, improving these skills would be an important part of liberal education. Second, research on transfer supports the view that transfer will take place. Research on transfer has resulted in a number of general principles.[10] For example, transfer is greater if the learner understands the general principles which are appropriate in solving a new problem or task. Furthermore the greater the similarity between the structural features of the training problem or the task and the problem in which the transfer is to take place, the greater the degree of transfer. Much of what a person learns in developing his or her ability to reason critically are general techniques or principles that can be applied to a variety of situations. Thus the first principle of transfer should be satisfied. What the second principle requires is that if we want people who are able to think critically about the broad spectrum of problems that face a person in a free society, the person should be given the prior opportunity to think critically about such problems. Thus students in a social science course should deal critically with realistic social problems as part of the course.

There is also more direct evidence that transfer of training will take place. In the Cooperative Study of Evaluation in General Education it was found that students who scored high on the general Test of Critical Thinking tended to do well on the Test of Critical Thinking in Social Science, the Test

of Critical Analysis in Reading and Writing, and the Test of Science Reasoning and Understanding.[11]

Several tests have been constructed to measure a person's ability to think critically. The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal is the culmination of over twenty-five years of research and experimentation.[12] In critical reviews it has consistently been evaluated as an effective test instrument.[13]

A variety of studies have shown that college students over a four year period significantly improve their ability to think critically.[14] It might be suggested that this is due simply to maturation and not necessarily to attending college. However some of the studies compared the college students with their non-college peers, and it was found that although the non-college peers improve their critical reasoning, the increase is not nearly as great. Furthermore a number of experimental studies, carried out at the elementary, secondary, and college levels, show that the ability to think critically can be improved as a result of courses that stress it or are designed specifically to teach techniques of critical reasoning.[15]

IV

Next we shall turn to the research done on the impact of college on the development of certain attitudes, personality traits, values and interests.[16] The studies were based on such instruments as the Omnibus Personality Inventory, Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale, and the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values.[17]

The general conclusion of the research done on the impact of college is that college students over a four-year period showed a greater liking for reflective thought, became more intellectually curious, more independent in

thought, were less dogmatic and more receptive to new ideas, became more tolerant and liberal in their political, economic, and social values. In general the changes were significant when compared with the changes of their peers who did not go to college, and this was true even when academic aptitude and socio-economic differences were controlled.

Studies also indicate that students enrolled in different curricula have as a group certain distinctive characteristics. For example on tests measuring political, economic, and social liberablism people in the social sciences scored high whereas people in the humanities spread across the three rankings of high, medium, and low, although they tended to be more in the medium category.[18] Students in the natural sciences and business were in the medium and low rankings.

When the intellectual orientation of students was considered, that is, whether they liked reflective thought and were intellectually curious, it was found that people in the liberal arts rank high or medium while people in business fall into the low category.[19]

The question arises whether these characteristics are due to the curricular experiences or whether these experiences merely facilitate change for those who are already predisposed to change. In other words, does majoring in a certain area have a real impact on the individual?

It has been shown that differences in characteristics typical of individuals initially selecting different majors tend to become accentuated as a result of the curricular experiences. Thus the initial differences among the students in the various curricula are made even greater. Feldman and Newcomb argue that this accentuation of initial differences is one measure of the impact of majoring in a certain area.[20]

A concrete example will make this clearer. The Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values measures the relative importance of six types of values. If a person scores high on the theoretical value, then he or she values the discovery of truth, his or her interests are empirical, critical, and rational. A Study by Huntly illustrates this accentuation of initial differences.[21] For example he found that of about 300 freshmen whose highest value was theoretical, almost half of them later majored in a science area. When these students were tested as seniors it was found that almost fifty percent of them increased their score even more on the theoretical value. In the case of those students who did not major in a science area but whose highest value was theoretical, it was found that when they were tested as seniors only twenty-five percent of them increased their scores on the theoretical value. It would be hard to explain this if majoring in a certain area did not have a real impact on the individual.

A review of the research thus makes it reasonable to conclude that liberal education can have an important impact on achieving the above discussed goals. The goals of liberal education are important for their liberating effect on individuals and the resulting consequences this has for society, for helping us to be more effective citizens in a participatory democracy, and for helping us to develop our personal qualities so that we may lead a fuller life. The goals are also important in the employment context.

> In many fields, . . ., there is nothing more important than an understanding of fundamental principles, an ability to analyze, to weigh evidence, to listen intelligently, to argue persuasively, to write clearly, to adjust to new circumstances. Even more generally, some sensitivity to other people, and their feelings, and a reasonably broad perspective on the world and its inhabitants, can be of enormous value in many callings.[22]

V

Although our discussion has been directed primarily at the goals of liberal education, we wish to make some brief remarks concerning the content of a liberal education. If we have correctly identified some of the main goals, then it would appear that no single course is absolutely essential in achieving these goals.[23] This in part would explain the diversity of approaches to liberal education, ranging from a set of prescribed courses to distributional requirements to a complete free election system. But some areas and courses will increase the probability of satisfying the goals better than others. For example a composition course in an English department is more likely to improve written communication skills than a course in mass communications offered by a Journalism department, and a philosphy course is more likely to improve critical reasoning skills than a course in history, since philosophy stresses critical reasoning.

Which areas and courses have a greater impact can be demonstrated empirically. For example, recent Graduate Record Examination data on over 800,000 students revealed that students who majored in philosophy scored very high on the three subtests of verbal, quantitative, and analytic. They were 2nd among the 22 Humanities areas, 1st among 26 Social Science areas, 2nd among 31 Biological Science areas, and 6th among 19 Natural Science areas. Of the 98 fields they ranked 8th overall.[24] When this data is combined with the finding that majoring in an area does have an impact on students, the result is quite clear that philosophy has a significant impact on students.

In determining what should be the content of a liberal education, we thus need to make sure that those areas which will maximize achieving the goals of

liberal education are stressed. Besides placing an emphasis on those areas and courses which will increase the probability of achieving the goals of liberal education, instructors need to stress such things as recognizing faulty reasoning, identifying underlying assumptions, seeking alternative approaches to problems, being receptive to new ideas, being original, expressing oneself clearly, and so on. Our courses need to be designed with these goals in mind, and we need to develop and use instructional materials that will be effective in achieving these goals.

There is even some recent initial evidence that certain specific classroom behaviors may tend to improve critical thinking. Flander's Interaction Analysis system is an instrument for recording verbal interaction in the classroom. The system and modified versions of it specify categories of verbal interaction such as faculty lecturing, questioning, the types of questions (memory type, evaluative questions, questions requiring a synthesis of material etc.), peer-to-peer interaction, student questioning and so on. After taping parts of the course, it is analyzed to determine how much and what kind of interaction took place. In a study by Smith it was found that the more student participation and encouragement by faculty, and the more peer-to-peer interaction, the greater improvement in certain aspects of critical thinking.[25]

Although we may think we are stressing critical thinking and independence of thought, our course content, organization, and style of teaching may belie this. The study by Smith indicates how important it is to seek student participation. In high school student participation often accounts for 17% to 26% of the class time. But in the study by Smith it was found that in the

college courses less than 20% of the class time was spent in student participation. Of this time only 2.6% was spent on questioning, and memory questions were the most frequently asked, not questons requiring evaluation, synthesis etc.

VI

A serious problem is occurring in the humanities and liberal education. There has been a rather sharp decline in enrollment nationally in the humanities and liberal education since 1970. From 1970 to 1978 freshmen who anticipated majoring in the arts and humanities fell from 13 to 7 percent. Business and vocational education have gained.

During the same period there also has been a dramatic change in student attitudes. According to a recent national study on college freshmen (released by the American Council of Education), students have become more materialistic and show a declining interest in public affairs and personal development.[26] Goals cited as very important or essential by first-year students in 1979 compared with 1969 showed these changes:

(a) Being very well-off financially was cited as being an essential goal by 32% of the women in 1969 as compared with 57% in 1979, and by 54% of the men in 1969 but 70% of the men in 1979.

(b) Helping others in difficulty was viewed as an essential goal by about 4% less in 1979.

(c) Developing a philosophy of life was viewed as an essential goal by about 30% less in 1979.

From 1970 to 1978 we have witnessed a decline in the enrollment in the humanities and liberal education. During the same period we have seen students become much more materialistic and less concerned with helping others and personal development. The Carnegie Council of Policy Studies in Higher

Education recently finished a study concluding that the next two decades will result in a 5-15% minimal reduction in undergraduate enrollment. The enrollment in the humanities and liberal education will certainly show a greater decline than other areas.[27]

Needless to say we view all of this as being very serious. The study of liberal education helps to develop certain abilities, attitudes, and values which are important for a humane, just and free society. There has been and will continue to be a decline in liberal education. The result, we believe, will be a weakening of those skills, attitudes and values so important to our society. The response to this situation should be that we stress liberal education. After Sputnik in 1957 there was a national commitment to science. What we are suggesting is that there needs to be a national commitment to achieving the goals of liberal education.

NOTES

[1]We shall argue below, however, that the knowledge, skills, and attitudes which liberal education fosters are vital in the employment context.

[2]The term "liberal arts", in Greek "eleutherai technai", means the skills that a free person ought to have.

[3]See Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), Chap. 1. Note also that a major thrust of the Women's Movement has been to help liberate women by expanding their awareness of alternatives.

[4]Sidney Hook, Education for Modern Man (New York: Dial Press, 1946).

[5]William G. Bowen, "Liberal Education at Princeton," Princeton Alumni Weekly, March 21, 1977, pp. 10, 11-12.

[6]Paul L. Dressel and Lewis B. Mayhew, General Education: Explorations in Evaluation, The Final Report of the Cooperative Study of Evaluation in General Education n(Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1954). Harvard University Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society, General Education in a Free Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1945). "Harvard's Report on the Core Curriculum," The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 6, 1978, pp. 1, 15, 16.

[7]B. Lamar Johnson, General Education in Action, A Report of the California Study of General Education in the Junior College (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1952), pp. 30-31. Kenneth A. Feldman and Theodore M. Newcomb, The Impact of College on Students (2 vols.; San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969), Vol. II, p. 154.

[8]Compare the abilities discussed by Robert H. Ennis, "A Concept of Critical Thinking," Harvard Educational Review, XXXII (1962): 81-111, and those of Goodwin Watson and Edwin M. Glaser, Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal Manual (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964). Factor analytic studies are providing help in identifying these abilities. See John Follman, "Factor Analysis of Three Critical Thinking Tests, One Logical Reasoning Test, and One English Test," The Psychology of Reading Behavior, Eighteenth Yearbook of the National Reading Conference, ed. by George B. Schick and Merrill M. May (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: National Reading Conference, 1969), pp. 154-160.

[9]Paul G. Hirst, "Liberal Education," Encyclopedia of Education, ed. by Lee C. Deighton (New York: Macmillan, 1971), V, 505-509. Harold Berlak, "The Teaching of Thinking," The School Review, LXXIII (1965): 1-13.

[10]Henry Ellis, The Transfer of Learning (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965.

[11]Dressel and Mayhew.

[12]Goodwin Watson and Edward M. Glaser, Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal: Manual (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964).

[13]Oscar Buros, The Fifth Mental Measurement Yearbook (Highland Park, New Jersey: Gryphon Press, 1965), sec. 867.

[14]Irvin J. Lehmann, "Change in Critical Thinking, Attitudes, and Values from Freshman to Senior Year," Journal of Educational Psychology, LIV (1963): 305-315. James W. Trent and Leland L. Medsker, Beyond High School (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968). James W. Trent and Arthur M. Cohen, "Research on Teaching in Higher Education," in Second Handbook of Research on Teaching, ed. by Robert W. Travers (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 997-1071.

[15]H. R. Anderson, et al., "An Experiment in Teaching Certain Skills of Critical Thinking," Journal of Educational Research, XXXVIII (1944): 24-51. Edward M. Glaser, "An Experiment in the Development of Critical Thinking" (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1963). Harold L. Herber, "An Inquiry into the Effect of Instruction in Critical Thinking Upon Students in Grades Ten, Eleven, and Twelve" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1959). Casey Jones, "The Effects of Participation in Discussions of Reasoning in Arguments on Critical Thinking Ability" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 1969). Mary L. Jones, "Teaching Critical Thinking and Problem Solving in Secondary Schools," California Journal of Secondary Education, XXXI (1956): 103-124.

[16]Feldman and Newcomb. C. William Huntley, "Changes in Study of Values Scores During the Four Years of College," Genetic Psychology Monographs, LXXI (1965): 349-383. Lehmann. Trent and Medsker. Trent and Cohen.

[17]Paul Heist and George Younge, Omnibus Personality Inventory (New York: Psychological Corporation, 1968). Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1966). Gordon W. Allport, Philip E. Vernon and Gardner Lindzey, Study of Values (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960).

[18]Feldman and Newcomb, Vol. I, pp. 161-164.

[19]Feldman and Newcomb, Vol. I p. 166, Vol. II, p. 123.

[20]Feldman and Newcomb, Vol. I, pp. 175-182, 193-194.

[21]Huntley.

[22]William G. Bowen, "Liberal Education Should 'Liberate'," Princeton Alumni Weekly, October 18, 1976, p. 3. A recent survey of American Telephone and Telegraph Company managerial employees found that employees who majored in the humanities or the social sciences have significantly stronger administrative and interpersonal skills than do those who majored in engineering, math, or science. The Chronical of Higher Education, June 1, 1981, p. 4.

[23]Neil L. Rudenstein, Dean of the College at Princeton and responsible for the undergraduate program, has said "The total pattern is what counts, not any single ingredient--or any single deficiency." Quoted by President Bowen, Princeton Alumni Weekly, March 21, 1977, p. 20.

[24]Raymond Herbenick, "How Philosophy Students Compete on Basic Skills," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 54, No. 4 (March 1981): 469-476.

[25]Daryl G. Smith, "College Classroom Interactions and Critical Thinking," Journal of Educational Psychology, LXVII (1977): 180-190.

[26]"The American Freshman: National Norms for Fall 1979," Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Graduate School of Education, University of California, Los Angeles.

[27]"Three Thousand Futures: The Next Twenty Years for Higher Education," Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 1979.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF REASON AND ITS EDUCATIONAL CONSEQUENCE

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It is often argued, especially by philosophers, that the essence of man is reason. Reason, said Aristotle, is what distinguishes human beings from beasts and is the source of all properly human activity. Following this line of thinking philosophers of education have maintained that reason is the essence of education, that education uses reason to promote reason and in the process contributes to the development of both the individual and society. On its face this seems rather straightforward. It represents the best of the humanistic and democratic tradition. An education in reason is nothing short of an education in becoming human. Unfortunately, we have some very abstract concepts here. Not only is it difficult to understand in concrete terms precisely what is involved in an education in reason, but the idea itself has changed and continues to change with circumstances. It is these changes that I wish to explore, ultimately for the sake of judging whether or not they have been for the better.

In classical thought reason was conceived as an objective and universal perspective on the truth. It was a way of transcending the particulars of one's life, those things such as feelings, desires, and the idiosyncracies of culture that distort or bias understanding. To be lacking in reason was to be a slave, and to be a slave was to be oppressed and, therefore, unfree. By itself knowledge could not save one from this fate. Knowledge was seen primarily as a means to an end, as a necessary but not a sufficient condition

for citizenship. One could know everything there was to know and still be a slave. To be free was to control your own destiny, to be master of your own ship. Of equal or greater importance than knowledge was the ability to see things from a perspective larger than your own.

This is the power of reason. Technically speaking, my reason is not really my reason. That is, within the classical tradition my reason is not created or defined by me. It is not, in this sense, subjective. It is a mode of understanding that I may choose to occupy or not occupy. But once in that mode I am more or less carried along objectively towards an objective outcome. It is rather like traveling on a modern day super-highway. Whether I get on or off is pretty much up to me. But once committed to the route, I am taken in a predetermined way towards a predetermined destination.

It is important to recognize that this conception of reason was not espoused out of the blue. Given classical metaphysics it makes perfect sense. Reason is a function of truth and is usually presented as the best way of knowing or getting at the truth. However truth is conceived, reason must give us access to it; that is the point of reason. In the classical tradition truth was conceived, quite understandably, as objective. That was the common sense view, and it still is. Whatever is true is independent of what we think, what we feel, or what we would like. At least this is what we often find when we get out into the world. Not that there is never a correspondence, but that there seems to be no necessary correspondence. And this is enough to convince most of us that correspondence, when it occurs, is no more than a happy coincidence and that truth itself always exists on its own, that is to say "objectively."

Obviously this common sense view is opened to telling criticisms. But even if it were acceptable, classical thinkers extended it to include another view that is far from common sense, and that nowadays is repudiated even by most philosophers; that is, the idea that truth is universal. Remember, we are talking here about truth in a substantive sense, not just in a formal sense, truth with a capital "T", as William James used to say. Classical thinkers reasoned that if truth is objective, it does not change; and if it does not change, it must be universal, that is, absolute. Thus, objectivity was tied by implication to universality. It was assumed that unless truth was universal it could not be objective, and that since it was objective it must be universal, and that this all had the certainty of cold, rigorous logic. Now we can see why reason was conceived as an objective and universal perspective on the truth. Because truth itself was conceived as objective and universal. And since reason was regarded as the best way of knowing or getting at the truth, reason had to represent an objective and universal perspective.

All of this was very carefully and reasonably worked out when all of a sudden, it is hard to say exactly when, perhaps sometime during the Middle Ages, the world began to change. People started to travel more, to explore more, to trade more, to go to war more--in short, to live more in the world of sensible experience. Ironically much of this was made possible by the achievements of the classical tradition, things like the development of mind, of ideas, of visions, of technology itself--in a phrase, those things that inspire daring and fuel revolution. People became more practical and less other-worldly. What caught their fancy was what they could in principle

experience. They wanted to do more, to get around more, to conquer more; and this led them to develop, or at least to encourage the development, of a new philosophy and a new way of dealing with the truth. Roughly speaking, the new philosophy was empiricism and the new way of dealing with the truth was science.

It was not so much that a world beyond experience was proven not to exist. It was simply given less priority. Other things were deemed by the culture to be more important. This had a dramatic effect on the idea of rationality. If truth was immutable and, therefore, outside of nature, then reason as the road to the truth would be necessarily independent of experience. Because experience is tied to nature through sense perception it could not possibly be used to get at the truth in this classical sense. But if we are no longer concerned primarily with this kind of truth, but rather with practical truth, with truth about this world, about its practical operations, with truth that helps us get around in nature, however variable that might be, then we find ourselves committed to experience as the basis of our thinking. For not only is experience an avenue to practical truth, it is the only avenue. As the best way of knowing or getting at the truth, reason becomes a function of our experience.

The problem is that experience is a function of practical interests and needs, and if reason is a function of experience, it is tied irrevocably to irrational and limiting forces. Our reason would truly be our reason, created by us, or by our culture, for <u>our</u> sake, for <u>our</u> purposes, to promote <u>our</u> welfare. It would hardly be a way of transcending the particulars of one's life. Gone would be the objective and universal perspective on the truth, the

power of reason to liberate us from accidental features of our existence. Reason, like knowledge and, ultimately, truth itself, would seem to be rather subject-dependent, not merely dependent or relative, but dependent on us, which is to say "subjective." Reason would seem to be no more than a clever way of getting what we want. As was recognized so clearly in the classical tradition, objectivity seems to imply universality, and if this is so, we give up the latter at the cost of the former. This applies to our concept of reason as well as to our concept of knowledge. And it applies to each of these as forcefully as it applies to our concepts of truth, goodness and beauty.

In politics the consequence has been to regard reason as an instrument of the status quo, as inherently conservative. Thus, if one is serious about change, that is, revolutionary or structural change, one should not pretend to reason. The imperative is to transform as expeditiously as possible the material conditions and power relationships of group life, and then, and only then, to let reason evolve as a protecting agent for the new culture. The message is clear. Far from being liberating, reason always exists with an organism. We can think of the organism as biological or cultural, individual or social, but it is constituted as a teleological system that struggles to survive and extend itself. Towards this end it develops reason. Outside of the system there is only unreason.

In education no less than in politics we reach a point where reason has no place. We operate instead on irrational self-interests, that is, on the perceived interests of the organism. These are irrational because they are neither universal nor objective. They are idiosyncratic. In the end they are

defined by us. To teach or critique them we cannot use reason, not if reason exists merely in their service. Reason could not transcend them. It could not get beyond them as accidental controls on our lives. Education would have to assume them, not just in the relatively benign sense of taking them on, but in the deeper sense of accepting them independently of reason. The teacher could not use reason to teach them, and the student could not use reason to learn them. They could be neither understood nor evaluated by reason. They would have to be adopted and employed irrationally, without rational justification, which is to say through "imposition." They would have to be imposed in the most imposing sort of way, through indoctrination or conditioning, or just plain physical force.

If we think of education as transmitting a humanistic and democratic way of life, then a humanistic and democratic education--let us just call it "education"--would have two basic functions. The first would be an adjustment or socialization function that would be a liberating function that would focus on the dignity and betterment of the individual, that would free the individual from external constraints and internal compulsions and end with a responsible moral agent, a person who acted as a moral force in the world.

There is, of course, considerable tension between these two basic functions. It often seems that doing one negates doing the other, and this has led some to conclude that they are incompatible, that ultimately one or the other must be given up, or at least given less priority. In professed theory it is usually the liberation function that is considered most important, while in practice the adjustment function almost always dominates. While not trying to minimize this tension, the hope of most of us is that

there is no need to choose or prioritize between them, that, at least when we speak of a way of life that is humanistic and democratic, socialization promotes freedom and liberation is socially advantageous. If we might for now assume this, it must still be recorded that the liberation function is the source of the claim that education uses reason to promote reason. But what if reason is not liberating? What if it lacks the power to be liberating? Where does this leave education in a society that considers itself humanistic and democratic?

These questions bring focus on the most pressing philosophical problem in modern education. If we cannot escape linking reason with experience, how can we think of reason as liberating, as enabling us to transcend and objectively evaluate the contingent, irrational and controlling forces to which all of us are subjected? There is one line of argument that seems especially promising. It requires us to rethink the distinction between appearance and reality. Traditionally this has been expressed as a distinction between things as they exist in our experience and things as they exist in themselves--in Kantian terms, "phenomena" and "noumena." But to the modern mind this distinction makes no sense. It has no rational basis and is, therefore, utterly unintelligible; for all we know we know through experience. For all we know, and ever will know, there are no noumena. The traditional distinction is unintelligible because the idea of a thing in itself is unintelligible. It makes sense as an ontological or substantive conception only outside of experience. But it is precisely experience that the modern mind cannot transcend, not when it is working for ontological or substantive understanding.

In these times if the distinction between appearance and reality is to be more than purely formal, it must be made within experience. Appearance becomes things within experience as they exist initially, our first impressions, so to speak. Reality becomes things within experience as they exist after we live with them for a while, after we handle them, think about them, use them, love them--that sort of thing. John Dewey had at least two names for this, "intelligence" and "inquiry." Both were virtually synonymous with "reason." But this must be read "reason within experience," not "reason as opposed to experience." It involves searching for practical truth in the most rigorous and disciplined yet decent manner possible. For Dewey, reason is still the best way of knowing or getting at the truth. But it gets its power not from transcending experience per se, but from transcending myopic or short-sighted experience.

Another more recent expression of this view is found in the work of Jurgen Habermas. He too thinks we are unfree, and he places great faith in the liberating potential of education. Interestingly enough, he regards most of the debilitating restrictions we live under as self-imposed, as placed on us not mainly by external coercive forces, but unconsciously by ourselves. As he puts it in one of his books, Theory and Practice, it is only because the prevailing "relationships of power" in society "have not been seen through" that they manage to control us the way they do.

These relationships have produced a network of highly repressive institutions and practices that we erroneously accept as necessary. We are led thereby to uphold and participate in a gratuitously restrictive set of social arrangements under the mistaken impression that they are indispensable

to our well-being. This not only results in frustration and anxiety, deprived as we are of many of the essential requirements of life, it also means we have imposed these conditions upon ourselves, since we owe them almost entirely to our own false consciousness.

To describe a form of consciousness as false implies first of all that the function of preserving coercive social arrangements has the inevitable effect of distorting our beliefs in such a way as to present our social world falsely; that is, as beliefs they are unwarranted. Second, it implies that the falsity of our present consciousness arises out of the manner by which we have acquired it; that is, it was acquired irrationally. When one social class dominates others to the point where it can project its way of seeing things throughout society, members of this dominating class can crush rival perceptions and make it appear that their own beliefs in fact serve to promote the general welfare. When this happens the result is what Habermas calls "an ideological form of justification" and, hence, an instance of false consciousness.

The only way out of this, Habermas claims, is through reason, and in particular through "critical reason." In its perfect, most powerful form critical reason is a function of the "ideal speech situation." This is that unique set of circumstances in which it is alone rational to acquire our "legitimating beliefs," the norms and attitudes that go into making up our "world picture" or "social consciousness." These circumstances must be those of ideologically undistorted--and, thus, "ideal"--speech. This means that our most basic opinions can be rationally formed only under conditions of absolutely free and unlimited debate. And in this process all parties to the

institutions and practices being set up must be capable of recognizing what they are freely consenting to. The only constraints must be those derived from what Habermas calls "the peculiar force of the better argument," or reason itself. If potentially repressive institutions and practices are to be rightly regarded as legitimate, it must be possible to imagine their creation under conditions of freedom and equality, and also to imagine their acceptance by the unforced consent of all those subsequently liable to be affected by their behavior. This is founded on something like C. S. Peirce's conception of truth as "the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate" thoughtfully and empirically, and his conception of reality as "the object represented in this opinion." More than once Habermas has acknowledged this link to Peirce. We obtain objective access to the truth in the ideal speech situation. And its validity for everyone is guaranteed by the fact that it is itself free from local assumptions or cultural particularity.

But as Habermas began by insisting, this is not how our current legitimating beliefs were in fact formed. Although our present consciousness prevents us from seeing it, they were formed under conditions of outright coercion and constraint. If only we could somehow be brought to a true consciousness of the situation in which our beliefs were actually formed, we would perceive at once that they are reflectively unacceptable; that is, we would recognize that the only reason they exercise any control over us is that we falsely believe them to have been acquired in an appropriate, rational way.

How can we ever hope, deluded as we are, to reach an unblinking recognition that our current legitimating beliefs are indeed reflectively

unacceptable? The role of critical reason--like that of the liberating function of education--is precisely that of emancipating us from our present state of bondage by enlightening us about the origin and nature of our false consciousness. In educational terms, the process takes place in three stages. The initial stage is to make us aware of the unconscious determinates of our present consciousness. We come to see that our current legitimating beliefs have not in fact been rationally acquired, and thus that our present desires and corresponding patterns of social behavior are out of line with our real or human interests. Next, this recognition brings us to a new cognitive state. In place of our earlier false consciousness, we rise to a true understanding of our social situation. In place of our earlier delusions we obtain an objective knowledge of the social world. Finally, this knowledge sets us free. We come to realize that there is no good reason for us to accept our current beliefs and the social arrangements they uphold. This by itself releases us from the irrational constraints of our existing culture, liberating us from alienating pressures and allowing us to enjoy a more authentic life.

The assumption that recognizing the origins of irrational beliefs will free us from their grip should be seen as having a Freudian character. The effort to overcome repression is basically a struggle I wage with myself, a struggle to uncover and reshape my initial motivation. The only difference between Freud and Habermas on this score, and admittedly this is important, is that Habermas does not trace the root causes of repression to our physiology, but rather to institutions and practices we mistakenly regard as legitimate and, hence, impose upon ourselves. Still, reason remains the cure. The

emphasis is on the "redeeming power of reflection." This was Dewey's faith too. We do not need to transcend practical interests and needs, only judge correctly whether they are real or rational.

So, what does the commitment to reason amount to in the twentieth century? If we cannot defend reason as it was conceived in the classical tradition, and should not defend it as subjective, what are the alternatives? There would seem to be only one. Reason represents a commitment to talk, to think, wonder and debate under conditions that exclude the will to power. It is opposed to fighting, to arrogance and self-righteousness, and to the desire to deceive and dominate. One should never think that reason could be reduced to technique, or to formal, depersonalized logic, for these can function merely to impose our subjective and, therefore, irrational preferences. Reason is a conversation within ourselves, between people, or with nature itself, and it constitutes nothing short of a mode of living, which is to say, a distinct culture or way of life.

To reason is to negotiate seriously and fairly with as many concerned parties as possible. The power of reason in the classical sense is also its power in this sense. It is the essence of man and distinguishes human beings from beasts. It has intrinsic as well as extrinsic value because it is liberating. It may never be all there is to a person, and perhaps that is a good thing. But it remains an ideal worth working for, not only our obligation, but our inspiration and hope for a better future.

IVAN ILLICH ON EDUCATION: EPIMETHEUS UNBOUND?

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Ivan Illich has, for some years, presented educators with an interesting, albeit somewhat uncomfortable, challenge. Coming from well beyond the "pale" within which most professional education critics dwell, Illich has nonetheless managed to mount a blistering attack on contemporary schooling. Even more impressive, perhaps, is the "deschooled" alternative he has offered, and the popularity with which this alternative has been met, both by the general public and by many educators.

Illich has been portrayed, by groups and individuals both "supportive" and "critical" of his work, as a man committed to just about every (and any) sort of ideology and social movement imaginable. To some he is a mystic authoritarian, to some a Marxist promoting the Revolution, to yet others a participatory socialist or even a supporter of entrepreneurial capitalism. In this paper, I would like to attempt to clear up some of these misunderstandings of Illich's educational thought. Both Illich's critique of contemporary schooling and his deschooled alternative will be presented and analyzed below in the hope that such discussion will be both informative and useful as we seek solutions to the many educational problems which confront us.

Education: The Real

The picture of contemporary schooling which Illich has painted in a number of works (the most notable of which is undoubtedly Deschooling Society) is far from a cheery one. Modern schooling, according to Illich, is basically a compulsory, age-specific process carried out by teachers, in schools for the

perceived good of society as a whole (though in reality the true "winners" in the "schooling game" are the society's elite).[1] Illich has identified four distinct functions of modern schooling, and it is to a brief analysis of these that we now turn.

The Functions of Schooling

The first function of schooling, on Illich's account, is that of providing custodial care to those deemed unfit for productive pursuits by society:

> As much as anything else, schooling implies custodial care for persons who are declared undesirable elsewhere by the simple fact that a school has been built to serve them. The school is supposed to take the excess population from the street, the family or the labor force.[2]

It should be borne in mind here, incidentally, that this "custodial" function of schooling applies not simply to the removal of ten year-olds from the home and to keeping sixteen year-olds out of the workforce, but to the "reassignment" of the elderly and retired in our society as well.

The second function of schooling is the process of "social role selection," which takes place as a consequence of the deliberate, planned sorting and tracking which occurs in the school in a variety of ways. This sorting is based, primarily, on what Illich terms the "ideology of merit" -- that is, on a belief in the meritocratic ideal. This ideal is reinforced by the school in its role as certifying agency, which ensures the continuity of faith in the efficacy of schooling. This is not to say, of course, that the school, any more than contemporary society as a whole, actually is meritocratic. Illich is well aware of the social class, racial, ethnic, sexual, and other variables which prevent the development of a true meritocratic order. His critique extends, however, even to the perfect meritocracy:

> A perfect meritocracy, in which there would be no excuses, is not yet upon us, and I believe it can be avoided. It must be avoided, since a perfect meritocracy would not only be hellish, it would be hell.[3]

The third function performed by schooling is the socialization, or indoctrination, of the young into the social order -- a social order which Illich, at least, sees as fundamentally unjust, based on an acceptance of social conformity, consumerism, and the "ideology of merit" which together perpetuate social ills. This is accomplished, in large part, through the "hidden curriculum" of the school.

Coming to grips with his notion of the "hidden curriculum" is imperative if we wish to understand Illich's educational critique, since it is the "hidden curriculum" which serves both to define and to measure education.[4] The "hidden curriculum" has succeeded in defining education in two significant ways. First, children (as well as the rest of us) have learned to accept

> that learning <u>about</u> the world is more valuable than learning <u>from</u> the world.[5]

Second, the "hidden curriculum" has allowed the translation of "learning" as an activity into "learning" as a commodity.[6] This commodity, in turn, becomes "education," and is hence a quantifiable and cumulative output of the social institution known as "school."[7] This, by the way, is an important facet of Illich's critique of the epistemological foundations upon which modern schooling rests. Illich asserts that knowledge has become objectified. As a consequence, schools are seen as factories, essentially, which produce "knowledge-as-commodity" rather than as aiding individuals to subjectively come to "<u>know</u>." The distinction here is that of <u>knowledge</u> and <u>knowing</u> -- the former being a thing which can be possessed, the latter an individual process which cannot be reified.

It is important to emphasize that the effects of the "hidden curriculum" are now a universal phenomenon, one no longer grounded in any specific ideology:

> It does not matter whether the curriculum is designed to teach the principles of Facism, liberalism, Catholicism, socialism or liberation, as long as the institution claims the authority to define which activities are legitimate "education".[8]

Indeed, Illich himself notes that:

> All over the world schools are organized enterprises designed to reproduce the established order, whether this order is called revolutionary, conservative, or evolutionary.[9]

The fourth function of schooling, which only rarely takes place, Illich implies, is education. From his discussion of this aspect of schooling, it is clear that he views such a result as occurring in spite of, rather than because of, schooling. In fact, Illich asserts that "the school has an antieducational effect on society"[10] as well as on the individual.

"Convivial" and "Manipulative" Institutions

A central feature of Illich's paradigm for the examination of any social institution is the nature of the institution itself. Institutions, for Illich, can be visualized as falling along a continuum ranging from "convivial" to "manipulative." The former, which are distinguished by spontaneous, voluntary use (even if use which is regulated to some limited extent), are the ideal desired by Illich. The latter, which are the dominant type in modern society, are coercive in nature, tend to be socially and/or psychologically "addictive," are very complex, and entail production processes which result in convincing consumers of their need for the goods or services offered by the institution.[11] Schools, of course, are institutions of the "manipulative" sort: they are compulsory state institutions, they breed in

their clientele an ever-expanding desire for more of their services, are incredibly complex, and certainly convince their clients (both successes and failures) of the need for the services provided by the school. As will be discussed in detail later, Illich's alternative to this state of affairs is the development of "convivial" educational institutions to encourage the process of education.

Within the institution of schooling, one of the major components which requires greater examination is that of the role of the teacher. The teacher in the modern school has, in Illich's view, become an impediment, rather than an aid, to the process of education.[12] This has come about as a result of the triple role the teacher is expected to play: as custodian, moralist, and therapist.[13] As Illich comments,

> Children are protected by neither the First nor the Fifth Amendment when they stand before the secular priest, the teacher. The child must confront a man who wears an invisible triple crown, like the papal tiara, the symbol of triple authority combined in one person. For the child, the teacher pontificates as pastor, prophet, and priest -- he is at once guide, teacher, and administrator of a sacred ritual.[14]

Summary

What has been attempted thus far is to lay out, as briefly as possible, the outlines of Ivan Illich's critique of contemporary schooling. At this juncture, I would like to provide you with a cornucopia of "vintage Illich" which will suffice to summarize, and perhaps even expand a bit, what has been discussed up to this point.

We should begin, of course, by noting Illich's firm rejection of any sort of obligatory schooling, regardless of the worthy aims to which it might lay claim:

> Equal educational opportunity is, indeed, both a desirable and a feasible goal, but to equate this with obligatory schooling is to confuse salvation with the Church.[15]

The risks of obligatory schooling are, in Illich's eyes, quite grave. Part of the trouble comes in confusing "knowledge" with "certification" of various sorts:

> At the end of the Middle Ages, people placed their trust in certificates which guaranteed indulgence. In our time of decadent civilization, people place their trust in certificates which establish that they possess something called "education."[16]

At least as serious concern is that the effects of such schooling are somewhat blinding for those fortunate enough to have received it:

> It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a man, who acquires this education, to recast his vision of the world from the perspective of a poor man.[17]

This last worry leaves us in the midst of what would appear, at least initially, to be a fairly circular dilemma. Illich recognizes this dilemma, though it must be admitted that he is not particularly helpful in resolving it:

> The secularization of the Christian faith depends on the dedication to it on the part of Christians rooted in the Church. In much the same way, the deschooling of education depends on the leadership of those brought up in the schools.[18]

Last, as we go on to examine Illich's ideal of the "deschooled" society, we should bear in mind his warning about superficial changes where structural ones are required:

> From the history of the Church, we know that simply reforming the liturgy is no guarantee of theological renovation.[19]

Education: The Ideal

Illich's critique of contemporary schooling, while both valid and useful, is neither so unique nor so original as has sometimes been suggested. The

critique is primarily a description of modern industrial-bureaucratic schooling, and stresses a variety of problems which were common knowledge long before Illich. As Maxine Greene has noted,

> Presenting not the slightest evidence that he has read the literature of education, Illich picks out the very problems with which researchers and philosophers have been concerned for at least fifty years and displays them before our (presumably horrified) eyes...I find it difficult to understand how people who <u>are</u> familiar with the literature can react to Illich's reports upon the schools as if he were bringing the news that God is dead.[20]

While I think that Greene has failed to recognize some important distinctions between Illich's message and the educational research and discussion which preceeded him -- not the least of which has been Illich's successful role in aiding the popularization of both knowledge of and concern about educational problems -- I would maintain that it is the critique of contemporary schooling which is the least controversial component of Illich's work. It is, rather, with his description of the deschooled society that Illich presents a creative and novel alternative, and it is to this alternative that we now turn.

Illich's goal has never been to reform or remake educational institutions <u>in vacuo</u>. He has long been concerned "with the monopoly of the industrial mode of production and with the conceptual alternatives that would fit a post-industrial age" -- and the first "industrial sector" which he chose to explore was that of schooling.[21] It should be noted that Illich himself has emphasized that the central belief of "deschooling" is

> that the alternative to the dependence of a society on its schools is not the creation of new devices to <u>make people learn</u> what experts have decided they need to know; rather, it is the creation of a radically new relationship between human beings and their environment.[22]

In short, deschooling should be conceived of as entailing two distinct, though overlapping, facets: first, a rejection of the "industrial mode of

production" in favor of more convivial post-industrial alternatives, and second, the development of a series of new relationships between human beings and their environment (as well as among one another). For Illich, then, restructuring the educational system consists of far more than simply providing different institutions in which learning could take place. New institutions alone are insufficient; rather, what is required is a fairly radical reordering of modern industrial society, and, even more important, of the attitudes, beliefs, and values upon which such a society rests and which it must continue to propagate.

Learning Webs

The educational institutions which Illich proposes, then, must be understood not as immediate alternatives but as alternatives for a social reality which has yet to be constructed. As Illich has noted,

> We are used to considering schools as a variable, dependent on the political and economic structure... The educational institutions I will propose, however, are meant to serve a society which does not now exist, although the current frustration with schools is itself potentially a major force to set in motion change toward new social arrangements.[23]

Illich's model educational system is based almost entirely on the interrelationships among four "learning webs," each concerned in its own way with making available to the individual learner whatever educational resources (be they things, models, peers, or elders) that s/he requires.[24] With the exception of these learning webs, there are only two significant features of Illich's educational model. The first is that of a permanent and binding commitment to education on the part of the polity:

> Such a system would require the application of constitutional guarantees to education. Learners should not be forced to submit to an obligatory curriculum, or to discrimination based on whether they possess a certificate or diploma.[25]

Second, Illich's model educational system requires -- indeed, assumes as a necessary condition -- the use of modern technology to "provide opportunity for free expression" and access to educational tools and resources.[26] This is not, of course, to suggest that Illich is unaware of the fact that the use of technology can be very much a two-edged blade:[27]

> Technology is available to develop either independence and learning or bureaucracy and teaching.[28]

It is Illich's four "learning webs," though, which together constitute the bulk of his "convivial" educational system. Each of the "webs" serves to provide the communicative connection between the learner and some educational tool or resource. It should be noted here, perhaps, that in each instance the "web" is learner-oriented and -directed, quite unlike much of contemporary pedagogical practice.

The first "learning web," which Illich labels "reference services to educational objects," is basically concerned with facilitating the learner's access to "things" -- which can also, in some instances, include processes.[29] Although this may initially appear to be a fairly innocuous porposal, this appearance takes on a somewhat different slant when one realizes just how broad Illich's notion of an "educational object" (i.e., "thing") actually is. Consider, for instance, Illich's claim that

> Much of the world's know-how and most of its productive porcesses and equipment are locked within the walls of business firms, away from their customers, employees, and stockholders, as well as from the general public, whose laws and facilities allow them to function.[30]

The implementation of the first sort of "learning web," then, might well result in:

> A truly public kind of ownership...emerg(ing) if private or corporate control over the educational aspect of "things" were brought to the vanishing point.[31]

The second type of "learning web" entails setting up "skills exchanges" where the learner will be able to locate individuals who can serve as skill models for those who are seeking to acquire their particular skills. Although any skills could be (and are) taught in this way now -- guitar lessons are Illich's own example[32] -- in the "deschooled" society a much greater variety of skills could be developed in this one-to-one sort of relationship. Illich notes that:

> I see no reason why other complex skills, such as the mechanical aspects of surgery and playing the fiddle, of reading or the use of directories and catalogues could not be learned in the same way.[33]

"Peer-matching," which consists primarily of providing learners with common goals access to each other should they so desire, is the third "learning web." The benefits of such a "web" are, for Illich, not only educational in nature, but social as well:

> Providing the young from their earliest age with invitations to meet, evaluate, and seek out others would prepare them for a lifelong interest in seeking new partners for new endeavors.[34]

The goal, then, is:

> an institution which increase(s) the chances that persons who at a given moment share() the same specific interest could meet -- no matter what else they ha(ve) in common.[35]

Last, the fourth of the "learning webs" is that of "reference services to educators-at-large," which would put interested learners in touch with independent, but nonetheless professional (and para-professional), educators.[36] Illich identifies three types of special educational competence which would be required in a "deschooled" society:

> One to create and operate the kinds of educational exchanges or networks outlined here; another to guide students and parents in the use of these networks; and a third to act as <u>primus inter pares</u> in undertaking difficult intellectual exploratory journeys.[37]

Access to each of these kinds of educators would, of course, be available to any interested learner, but would also -- quite unlike the contemporary role of the educator -- be entirely voluntary in nature.

Summary

In sum, the whole of Illich's educational (and, indeed, social) Utopia is grounded in the ideal of "liberation." On its own, "deschooling" is inadequate -- and potentially dangerous, since it could lead just as easily to a "brave new world" as to liberation.[38] Taken as a part of other meaningful social change, however, the deschooling of culture and society might together be the beginning of the "rebirth of Epimethean Man."[39]

The "liberation" referred to here is that of freeing individuals to teach, exercise, or share their skills and interests with others. It is the "liberation" of human creative and critical capacities for whatever purposes individuals may choose, as well as freedom for people to speak for themselves rather than to be "spoken for" by monopolizing institutions. It is the abolition of control over educational tools and resources by the few at the expense of the many, and the guarantee of free access to such tools and resources for everyone in society.[40] It is, in short, the assurance that education can be used to

> create the humanity, the dignity, and the joyfulness of each one of us(.)[41]

An Ending: Illich and the Epimethean Man

This paper has been concerned with providing an analysis of the educational thought of Ivan Illich, who undoubtedly remains one of the most important social critics of modern schooling. In both his critique of modern schooling and his enticing (albeit unsettling) view of possible educational

alternatives, Illich has offered and continues to offer a great deal of food for thought -- both for educators and for the public. Even if we choose a path other than Illich's, it will be hard to reject the goal of the "Epimethean Man," that individual guided by hope rather than expectation, and for whom love of people is greater than love of products, which Illich has set before us.[42]

NOTES

1. Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 38; also Chapter 2.

2. Ivan Illich, "The Futility of Schooling in Latin America," Saturday Review 51 (20 April 1968): 58, quoted in Michael Macklin, When Schools are Gone: A Projection of the Thought of Ivan Illich (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1976), p. 25.

3. Ivan Illich, A Celebration of Awareness (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), p. 182.

4. Ivan Illich, Toward a History of Needs (New York: Bantam Books, 1977), p. 84.

5. Ibid., p. 83.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Illich, The Alternative to Schooling, p. 3, quoted in Macklin, When Schools are Gone, p. 27.

9. Ivan Illich, "After Deschooling, What?" in Ivan Illich et al., After Deschooling, What? (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 2.

10. Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 11.

11. Ibid., Chapter 4.

12. Ivan Illich, "Critica a la liturgia de la ensenanza," in Paulo Friere et al., Educacion para el cambio social (Buenos Aires: Tierra Nueva, 1974+), p. 103.

13. Illich, Deschooling Society, pp. 44-46.

14. Ibid., p. 46.

15. Ibid., p. 15.

16. Illich, "Critica," p. 100.

17. Ibid., p. 101.

18. Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 36.

19. Illich, "Critica," p. 105.

20. Maxine Greene, "And Still It Is News," in Illich et al., After Deschooling, What?, p. 129.

21. Illich, Toward a History of Needs, p. 80.

22. Ibid.

23. Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 105.

24. Ibid., p. 109.

25. Ibid., p. 108.

26. Ibid., p. 111.

27. See also Illich, Toward a History of Needs, pp. 108-109.

28. Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 111.

29. Ibid., p. 112.

30. Ibid., p. 123.

31. Ibid., p. 125.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 127.

34. Ibid., p. 132.

35. Ibid., p. 133.

36. Ibid., p. 114.

37. Ibid., p. 141.

38. Ibid., p. 149; see also, Illich, Toward a History of Needs, p. 109.

39. Illich, Deschooling Society, Chapter 7.

40. Ibid., pp. 149-150.

41. Illich, Celebration of Awareness, p. 15.

42. Illich, Deschooling Society, pp. 166-167.

HERMENEUTICS AND PAIDEIA

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The approach to education I want to defend comes closer to the Greek ideal of paideia and the German notion of Bildung than it does to the educational ideals and practices of our scientific culture, which are applications of the enlightenment ideals of modernity. It will be helpful to place this approach in historical context. I shall briefly do so by sketching the highlights of the contrast between modern and classical educational ideals, and connecting each of them to conflicting notions of society, knowledge and learning.

The Greek notion of paideia is bound up with the Greek distinction between theoria, praxis and poesis, and thus with the differences between episteme, phronesis and techne. Episteme/theoria, or productive knowledge, is concerned with the various crafts and arts, e.g. medicine, navigation and so on. The ends of such activities are bound up with the traditions and social practices in which they are embedded thus the skills or techne of each craft is aimed at the realization of the goods that these social practices aim to achieve. Praxis/phronesis covers the political and moral spheres of human life. The deliberation of ends is inseparable from the actions taken to achieve them. Phronesis, or practical knowledge and wisdom, rests upon the idea that some people can learn to make better judgements or have sounder opinions than others, but virtue of experience, maturity, good fortune, insight and so on. Phronesis cannot be taught, at least not exclusively by precept, but rather by example and apprenticeship.

In modern, scientific society, phronesis becomes a form of applied episteme--praxis is applied theoria--or branch of techne. This leads to the idea that politics is a branch of technology, and that education consists in teaching people "the facts" and the "right method", which ought to be equally applicable by all rational agents to achieve the same results. Modern education is thus egalitarian, whereas the notion of phronesis is connected to a notion of qualitative excellence that not everyone can achieve equally.

Recent critics of scientific culture, notably Habermas and Gadamer, have attempted to revitalize the Greek understandings of things, as part of their critique of modernity. In order to get beyond the limits of scientific culture, we must revitalize the Greek ideals of politics and education, by appropriating their insights about phronesis and praxis. Gadamer expresses this program as follows:

> In a scientific culture such as ours the fields of techne and art are much more expanded [than for the Greeks]. The crucial change is that practical wisdom can no longer be promoted by the mutual exchange of views among the citizens. In modern technological society public opinion itself has in a new a really decisive way become the object of very complicated techniques--and this, I think, is the main problem facing our civilization. . . . How can we learn to recover our natural reason and our moral and political prudence? . . . How can we reintegrate the tremendous power of our technique with a well-balanced order of the society and reconstitute a living solidarity?[1]

In short, the overcoming of modernity's fragmentation requires a notion of community of Gemeinschaft; and this involves a retrieval of Aristotle's insights about phronesis, praxis and paideia.

But the recovery of these insights, as a step toward cultural renewal, is out of kilter with the notions of knowledge, learning and education that dominates our scientific civilization. It is therefore appropriate to spell out the education ideals of the Artistotle-Gadamer ideal, and compare them with the doctrines abroad today.

We may begin with the educational ideals and practices of scientific, enlightenment, liberal-democratic society. Modern education is based on several related notions: the idea that scientific method is the road to truth; a form of radical educational egalitarianism, and two principles which Karl Mannheim calls "The Principle of the Ontological Equality of all Men" and "The Principle of the Autonomy of the Social Units" in his great essay, "The Democratization of Culture."[2]

Professor Wolff glosses Mannheim's interpretation of these "principles" as follows:

> 1. 'The principle of the ontological equality of all men' shows itself . . . in the democratic directive that knowledge be accessible and communicable to everybody (epistemologically founded in Descartes' 'clear and distinct' ideas and Kant's 'necessity' and 'universal validity' as criteria of true knowledge) and in the replacement of the connoisseur by the expert, and of 'articulation of a global intuition' . . . by increasingly abstract analysis (explanation) 2. 'The autonomy of the social units' . . . is indicated by the conception that the individual can gain knowledge, and criticize traditional beliefs, by a spontaneous use of his own mental energies . . . . (ibid, xcii)

In other words, scientific method is substituted for phronesis, and political individualism and a rationalist conception of politics replaces the idea of praxis, or practical deliberation. But, as Oakeshott reminds us, the rationalist is a person who lives every moment as if it were their first; so that the wisdom of tradition, needed for paideia and practical deliberation in a Gemeinschaft, is set aside by modernity as so much pre-scientific prejudice.

It needs to be emphasized that I am not an enemy of democracy; but it also must be said that democracy may require deals of human excellence which only the cluster of notions I am discussing can provide: without shared traditions and phronesis, political deliberation is a sham. But in a scientific culture, education produces a curious mixture of tolerance about everything, together

with a continuous ossiliation between dogmatism and nihilism in the public and private spheres. Whatever cannot be dealt with by the right method mechanically applied to the facts, e.g., in cost benefit analyses, is mere opinion, and gets resolved either by "experts" or by power politics in the form of factionalism.

Hannah Arendt, with characeristic insight,[3] brings out these themes in her essay "Truth and Politics". She observes that agreement about contingent truths is a necessary condition for activity in the public sphere; and that skepticism about such truths is the main problem of modern politics. She relates a story about Clemencean who, when asked what future generations would say about the Great War, replied that he was sure of only one thing: nobody would say that Belgium invaded Germany. Unfortunately for us all, Arendt and Orwell were more sagacious, as the following example illustrates.

In a recent syndicated newspaper column by the Yale psychiatrist Walter Reich, called "Old antisemitism behind new Holocaust revisionism" we hear the following:

> A wave of "historical revisionism" is washing over the country, part of it originating in Europe, but much of it generated here at home. What is being revised is the conventional history of the Holocaust, with the argument being put forward that it was a hoax perpetuated to gain sympathy for the Jews and for the state of Israel. The revisionists have pleaded for equal time, in the name of academic freedom. Most of us still find their argument absurd and the motivations behind it patent. But others, especially the young, seem willing to consider it, on the peculiarly contemporary grounds that everything is debatable, and that nothing should be accepted as true that was not personally seen and experienced . . . if the revisionists are successful in rendering the Holocaust as just another matter for debate, then no piece of history is safe, nothing can remain a true fact, all human experience is conveniently subject to ideological interpreation or wishful negation and we become nothing more than we believe.[4]

In a scientific culture, everything not subject to scientific "proof" is debatable and brought before the bar of reason; and thus we see how the educational ideals of scientific culture work in practice. And this mentality is deeply ingrained in us all: perhaps the revisionists are right, just as Galileo was right a long time ago. He, too, was a revisionist.

But the ideals of phronesis and praxis don't preclude all revisionism: traditions are dynamic, not static. But revisions must be modifications in existing traditions, as agreed to by the people with phronesis who practice and transmit them; the Holocaust revisionist is possible only in a scientific civilization. (So, arguably, is the Holocaust itself; but that is a topic for another occasions.) For it is based upon the belief that all opinions are mere opinions; that one can't distinguish between reasonable and crazy opinions by appeal to phronesis or the shared traditions and social practices that constitute the horizons of a cultural/historical world.

So I am not suggesting that social criticism or revisionism is impossible, or not to be tolerated. But I am arguing that skepticism of the sort we are considering is but the other side of the rationalist project, begun by Socrates and alluded to by Wolff as the criticism of traditional beliefs by a "spontaneous use of one's own mental facilities", which holds to the idea that knowledge and therefore criticisms of shared beliefs and practices can arise de novo out of an individual's head, or by the use of scientific methods. It leads to the idea that everything not subject to scientific replication and method is a subjective opinion. And it is connected with the modern idea that any individual can criticize his/her traditions by the same "spontaneous resources" that supposedly make every moment the first for a rationalist: one

must accept only that which one has discovered for oneself. As Richard Rorty argues,[5] contemporary philosophers--and, I want to add, advocates of scientific education--are the true heirs to the sophists and cousins to the shyster lawyer: they can argue for and against any position with equal facility and equal conviction--presumably in the name of tolerance and academic freedom.. But the ideals of paideia and Bildung, as Durkheim saw, require that a culture rule out certain possibilities as not in keeping with their traditions or horizons; if they do not, we get what Phillip Rieff calls "an impossible culture"--a society that is fragmented and without purpose.

This same type of conclusion is expressed by Heidegger and Gadamer, and hooks up with the tradition of Aristotle, Burke, Ilegel and Oakeshott. For Heidegger, the idea of eternal free floating truths, that can be expressed in an abstract scientific system, and which embodies the enlightenment ideals of knowledge, rationality, and the unity of mankind, is an illusion; thus scientific education, which is founded upon these aspirations, rests upon impossible aims. For Heidegger, truth is a relationship between the self-presencing of Being, which is temporal and finite and the way in which human beings in a given cultural/historical world understand the phenomena that show themselves in time through their specific preunderstandings and horizons. Truth will be different in each cultural/historical world, because each world opens up a clearing within which Being presences itself to a given culture in a unique way. So Heidegger appropriates the insights from Aristotle and her German heirs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, e.g., Schiller and Herder. All knowledge, all learning, all possible modes of acting and understanding, are finite and historical. We are limited by the traditions which we are part of whether we like it or not.

But for the enlightenment ideals, as embodied in modern education, a choice of beliefs and modes of acting must be seen as the result of proceeding in an ahistorical logical vacuum: all logically possible alternatives must be permuted, surveyed, brought before the bar of reason, so that the "best" alternative can be rationally agreed to by all agents. If this can't be done, the choice is irrational. This is why the rationalists must live every moment as if it were their first. And it is why holocaust revisionists can ply their wares and get taken seriously in our "impositible culture". And this in turn only aggravates the dialectic of skepticism and dogmatism, of factionalist power politics and usurption of the public realm by experts. Like philosophers according to Berekeley, we have kicked up a dust and then complain that we do not see, The Heideggerian alternative--that our possibilities are neither arbitrary nor logically compelling, but historical, cannot gain a foothold with us.

But if this is true, we must admit that knowledge is connected to human historicity in a cultural/historical world essentially and inescapably. More positively put, knowledge and learning are bound up with phronesis. And phronesis is connected with the historically specific practices, traditions and experiences of a given cultural/historical world. It follows that education is primarily paideia or enculturation into a shared tradition. But this doesn't mean that traditions are static, or that learning is impossible, or that traditions cannot learn from each other. Traditions are constantly changing, largely as a result of the fact that individuals trained in them modify these traditions in novem ways. But this couldn't be possible unless education were seen in the wider framework of the expressivist ideals of

paideia and Bildung. Nor will science and science education be left out; but they will be removed from their archemedean positions in society. Moreover, as Kuhn, Polanyi and others have shown us, science, too, is a tradition, and scientific knowledge is a form of phronesis, and in no special way better or more privileged than any other mode of disclosure.

If all this is plausible, we must learn to make sense out of such notions as insights, judgement, intuition, connoisseurship, non-conceptual knowledge and skills. Learning and knowledge become tied to the transmission and appropriation of traditions, customs and phronesis. And so we must recognize that not everything learnable is teachable; and that not everyone can achieve the same levels of phronesis.

It follows from the argument I have been making that the truly educated person is the one who has the phronesis to take up, appropriate and modify his or her traditions in the most novel way, i.e., which allows their best possibilities to disclose themselves for appropriation by members of that community. Even the revolutionary activities of a Socrates or an Einstein, or the attempt to fuse one's traditions with those of other cultures, must begin at this level.

Moreover, literature, poetry, myth and so on will be at least as important as science and math, etc., since these embody knowledge too, and are just as important--if not more so--to paideia and the appreciation of alternative possibilities within and without one's traditions--as is science. Indeed, science itself can only be understood historically.

Finally, the universal civilization that is the aim of enlightenment educational ideals can, perhaps ironically, only be achieved if all traditions

preserve their identity and contribute to the good of the whole, conceived as a global Hegelian Sittlichkeit. The enlightenment's ideal of the unity of mankind is at best the notion of a melting pot in which all traditions get lost in the stream, and at worst a piece of ethnocentrism, or what Gramci called "cultural hegemony", and Heidegger calls the "Europeanization of the Earth." A world civilization whose framdwork and rules are dominated by the ideas disclosed to one cultural/historical world is not a true world community. It is at best of a piece with the error Nietzsche and Heidegger ascribe to western rationalism: the attempt to fix a narrow range of the phenomena that disclose themselves in time, linger and pass away, and define all truth and knowledge within its terms. It is only when we take these ideas to heart that we can truly take other points of view seriously. But we must begin with our own culture, and with the project of recovering the traditions it contains, especially, I have argued, the traditions that incorporate the Greek insights of the German tradition, from nineteenth century romanticism-expressivism, to the fundamental ontology of Heidegger and the hermeneutical recovery of tradition worked out so forcefully by Gadamer and English-speaking philosophers such as Charles Taylor. Until this is done, we won't move beyond the age of nihilism, which produces an impossible culture at home and the Europeanization of the earth abroad.

NOTES

[1]Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Hermeneutics and Social Science," Cultural Hermeneutics, 1975, 313-14.

[2]Reprinted in Kurt Wolff ed. From Karl Mannheim, OUP.

[3]Reprinted in Between Past and Future.

[4]Washington Post, 1981. My emphases.

[5]"Philosophy in America Today," American Scholar 1982, 183-200.

A BASIC INGREDIENT OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION:

A BLEND OF PHILOSOPHIES

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Historical Overview

The publication of A.S. Neill's Summerhill in 1960 sparked the growth of free schools across the United States.

Their emergence was accompanied by other major social upheavals produced during the turbulent Sixties. The Civil Rights movement was gaining momentum. Increasing levels of technology and bureaucratization depersonalized all phases of mainstream American society and fused a radical reaction. The Vietnam war brought protest to a significantly high level. Social change was the order of the day and in the educational arena, alternative schools were the advance guard. Fueled by the writings of Paul Goodman, Edgar Friedenberg, Ivan Illich, Everett Reimer, John Holt, George Leonard, Herb Kohl, Jonathan Kozol, James Herdon, and others, the momentum of the new school movement increased.

Change was underway, taking many different forms. Urban schools, suburban and rural ones, boarding schools, day schools, intentional communities having little by way of structured educational settings, learning centers -- all were part of the wave of response to the need for reform. They bore the names:

- free schools
- freedom schools
- street academies
- community schools
- alternative schools

They were started by parents of students or teachers or a combination of these. (None were begun by established school administrators, or boards of education or university schools of education.) Their common tie was their

disillusionment with public schools and their desire to de-institutionalize the educative process. The live expectancy of an alternative school in the early years was eighteen (18) months.

The first alternative schools were non-public (usually called private) schools. By 1972, the public schools began to imitate the non-public alternative schools and a wide variety of innovations were born.

Definition

For the purpose of this paper, only the non-public (independent) alternative schools which have stood the test of time (ten to sixteen years) and have survived, are included. Even among so select a group -- approximately 300 schools -- there is no "typcial" school. They are as varied as the populations they serve. They are preschools or elementary schools or high schools or a combination of some or all of these. They are inner city, urban, suburban, and rural schools. None claim to embody any one particular philosophy.

The Network: NCACS

The network for the alternative schools is the National Coalition of Alternative Community Schools. Member schools endorse the following tenets:

> "We are a national coalition of schools, home school groups and individuals committed to creating an egalitarian society by actively working against racism, sexism, ageism and all forms of social political and economic oppression. The objective of the Coalition are:
>
> 1. To support an educational process which is alternative in intention, working to empower people to actively and collectively direct their lives.
> 2. To support an educational process which is alternative in form, requiring the acitve control of education by students, parents, teachers and community members who are most directly affected.

3. To support an educational process which is alternative in content, developing tools and skills to work for social change.[1]

As different from one another as the schools are, these basic similarities do maintain, and it is these which serve as the points of departure for the overview of the structure and the values and practices of the schools.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Governance

On a day to day operational level, those closest to the educational process -- teachers and students (and in many cases, parents) -- govern the school. Due to the relatively small size of the schools, and to deliberate design, the attitude that "we are the school" prevails; so calling all together to work things out is a general practice.

Parents, along with staff and students, serve as members of policy-making boards, guiding and supporting the schools. The hiring and firing of teachers, student recruitment, building and grounds maintenance, planning school activities such as trips, camp-outs, retreats, and fundraisers, and exploring community resources available to school members constitute the general business handled by the policy board. Some shcools have formal boards of directors to fulfill the requirements for incorporation and/or to concentrate upon financial issues. Interested community members, professional people, friends of the school, local business people, and alumni also serve on many of the formal boards.

Finances

Those who took it upon themselves to found new schools were on their own as far as funding the schools was concerned. Although there is no single educational system mandated by the central government in the United States, there is a single method of financing the State educational systems, the allocation of tax monies. In the area of financing, then, public schools are the "only game in town." Alternative schools began and continued in operation by obtaining funds wherever they could. Most were started with the savings of parents or staff. The sources of income for 75% of the schools are tuition fees, fundraising, and contributions. A few schools (fewer than 12%) supplement these sources by leans and grants from corporations or government. A growing trend among the schools is to establish a business in conjunction with the school, run by parents, students, and staff which provides a reliable, steady source of income. For example, the Free School in Albany, N.Y. and Horizons School in Atlanta, Georgia both purchased downtown apartment buildings in their respective cities which school members renovate and lease out.

Those schools which were eligible for federal funds -- CETA, food programs, A.D.C. child care payments, etc., have watched these sources dry up in the past two years. The prospect of tuition tax credits or establishing a system of vouchers looms for many of the schools as the sole hope for financial survival.

Per pupil expenditure in the schools is considerably lower than that of traditional schools. (The average per pupil expense in public schools nationwide was $3100 in the 1981-82 school year; in alternative schools, it

was less than $1800.) The major budget expenses are salaries, rent payments, materials and equipment.

Political Awareness

Specific efforts to reach beyond the periphery of the school and effect change in the social and political realm range from social issues classes for students to direct involvement in local, national, and international issues and events. In most of the schools, the members are aware of themselves as a political force in the community. Since all are licensed or approved by state and local fire, building and safety, and health officials, all must engage in bureaucrat-watching: a political involvement of the most basic sort.

The presence of independent alternative schools in numerous communities has contributed to changes in public schools by way of the establishment of open classrooms, schools without walls, schools-within-schools, and the like.

The Legal Question

All states have statutes concerning compulsory school attendance for at least ten years. Beyond this, state and/or local authorities dictate building code requirements, zoning regulations, the content of the curriculum, teacher certification, medical forms, and attendance forms. These legal realities have frequently been the death of alternative schools who could not afford yet another salary for a form-keeper or for repairs and renovations to bring a building up to code.

With the emergence of home schools, the legal definition of what constitutes a "school" is being examined in numerous states, the country

over. It appears now that the current struggle for alternative education has moved from the classroom to the courtroom.

OPERATIONAL PROCESSES

Values

Alternative schools attempt to educate the whole person, and, in doing so to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the arbitrary divisions of grade levels, subject areas, departments, classroom periods, testing, grading, and rule-by-the-sound-of-the-bell. They attempt to meld living with learning, to merge school with home life and with life in the larger society. Alternative education questions boundaries -- the boundary between school and community; the boundary between school and home; the boundary between teacher and student.

Freedom to choose is open to teachers who are largely autonomous, to students who are guided by their own interests and needs, and to parents who elect to send their children to the schools and who have a voice in the operation of them. Teachers can learn and students can teach and the individual worth and dignity of each is respected by the other.

Affective growth is given equal billing with cognitive growth. The community is used as a classroom; educational resources are not limited to chalkboards, papers, pencils, textbooks, and workbooks. The doors open both out and in: community members are frequently visitors, sharing talents, information, and interests with the school family.

Emphasis is placed more heavily on helping people learn how to learn than in presenting them with what to learn. Tools for enabling people to act effectively within a group (one where people actually work, play, suffer and

rejoice together) are examined, discussed, and assimilated. In most schools, students are not relegated to groups according to their chronological ages; multi-age groupings replace age/grade level assignments.

Curriculum

In the traditional school, a standardized curriculum, developed by adults, is presented as the matter which students must attempt to cover; consequently, students have very little (or no) say in what should be learned. Teachers may try to make the standardized curriculum as interesting as possible, and, in some schools, students may cover it at their own pace; nevertheless, student input is minimal or non-existent. In alternative schools, students and staff develop the curriculum, frequently in consultation with parents. Students' interests are the focus of the individually-tailored curriculum, and the relation of these interests to the rest of the world is the thrust of the combined efforts of teachers and parents. Teachers are not solely responsible for the activities in the classroom.

The content of the curriculum is not only subject matters but also experiences of various kinds: critical examination of the "sacred cows" of authority, social customs and mores, problem-solving, and democratic decision-making. Objective content and book learning combined with direct experiential relation with "the real world", then, best describes alternative school curricula.

Time is loosely scheduled so that activities, once begun, can be followed through to an acceptable conclusion. Whereas in traditional schools activities are controlled by the clock and the bell, in the alternative school, the activities structure time.

Space in alternative schools, unlike their conventional counterparts, is made to function for the participants and is subject to frequent change via re-arrangement of furnishings -- partitions, book cases, curtains, scatter rugs, lofts, and the like. Out-of-doors, the community becomes the classroom. Shaker Mountain School in Burlington, Vermont takes a minimum of four long trips each school year: hiking in the Rockies, and studying Indian reservations in New Mexico, for instance. Clonlara School has extended its travels beyond the boundaries of the United States and Canada to Ireland so far. Each year alternative school students, staff, and parents from all parts of the country convene at the site of the National Coalition of Alternative Community Schools membership conference. Trips, near and far assure outreach into the "real" world.

Problem-solving and critical thinking are integral to the curricula developed in alternative schools. Students are led to assume the responsibility for setting their own schedules, arranging time, and developing habits of acquiring, using, and enjoying knowledge. The basic skills of reading, writing, and computing are mastered at a pace consistent with the individual differences of each learner. The principles of self-determination, self-realization, and self-integration come into play. By contrast, the traditional school curriculum is subject-centered. The problem of student retention of information is not guaranteed, and the development of critical thinking processes is not nurtured.

Methodology

A.S. Neill once said that if someone really wants to learn something and is ready to learn it, the method is insignificant; the student will learn because of or in spite of the method employed. Certainly, there is no single method peculiar to alternative schooling. The entire range of approaches is present in even just one alternative school -- dialectic, memorization, lecture, and project methods. Some schools may concentrate more heavily on one method or on a combination of several, but getting the job done seems to greatly outweigh the manner in which this is accomplished. Many of the methods and materials of the traditional schools are used in alternative schools, also.

Democratic process in curriculum development and in decision-making about subjects to be taught, student deportment, and problem-solving are characteristic to most alternative schools. Probably the farthest departure these schools take from traditional modes of learning is the incorporation of play as an integral part of the curriculum. It's not unusual for a visiting observor to ask, "When does school start?" after watching the activities for an hour or more.

Artificial rewards, such as grades, prizes, rankings, etc., are conspicuously absent from alternative school methodologies.

Roles: Teachers and Students

The teacher as central figure in a classroom, as the source of rules and directions, as the arbiter of disagreements and the student as unquestioning follower are antithetical to alternative schools. Rather than deciding,

determining, and controlling the school activities and behaviors of the students as "educational experts", teachers in alternative schools share power with the students, and, to a large degree, with the parents, too. Students have a right to question a teacher's judgments just as teachers have a right to question those of students. Both are responsible, the for what goes on both in the general operation of the school and on a day-by-day basis. In the larger society all must solve problems related to the distribution of power, freedom, authority, and responsibility, so in the schools must this process begin in earnest, not by way of book-learning and indoctrination, but by actual daily practice.

Teachers respect the right of children to work at their own rate. Teachers and students together assess the interests and needs of students so as to create an environment complimentary to those interests and needs. The teacher's imperative is to arrange the learning situation in such a way as to illuminate for every individual present that he or she is free to set goals, to make choices, and accept responsiblitiy for his or her own actions.

A PHILOSOPHICAL MIX

An examination of the major philosophies netted three to which the roots of today's alternative schools can be traced. The three, Naturalism, Pragmatism, and Existentialism blend to form an eclectic fabric, tailored to fit the schools' forms and functions.

Naturalism

From the literature dealing with naturalism vis a vis education, one can infer from the Naturalist's view of the child, (an animal with a long, dependent infancy), that learning, even in schools, is a very natural thing. An understanding of the essential nature of the child is necessary before any effective measures can be fashioned for teaching.

The naturalist opposed the formalized, teacher-centered methods of the Medieval and Renaissance scholars which presumed the student as a passive recipient of the knowledge transmitted to her. Recitations and written and oral examinations were the student's "activity". The repression of the natural instincts and desires of the learner, aimed basically at curbing the evil tendencies of youthful nature, were also opposed by the naturalist, as was the authoritarianism of teachers.

The naturalist proposes that all teaching methods be based on experience and that the student must observe nature to find facts and solutions to problems. What the child learns should be determined by his/her own developmental level, not by a teacher or the society; educational activities should be enjoyable for the learner.

In Pestalozzi's school, children participated actively in school life. Learning was not a separate activity; field trips, absence of formal classes and externally-applied discipline were part of the daily routine.

The content of the curriculum was selected to help students achieve growth in their whole person, not merely intellectually, and to prepare them for life, for earning a living, and for attaining their potentialities.

Numerous threads of commonality can be traced which root today's alternative education in Naturalism. The following list of values adhered to by alternative school folks were accentuated by naturalists:

- education of the whole person
- integration of living and learning
- freedom of choice
- individual worth and dignity
- joy in education
- affective growth
- use of community as classroom

The curriculum in both types of schools place emphasis upon:

- child centered approach
- experiental learning
- sensory perception
- trips

Methods employed in naturalist schools are similar to those of alternative schools, especially the use of:

- induction and dialectic
- play
- absence of rewards and punishments

The roles of teachers and students are characterized by:

- understanding child development
- recognizing individual differences
- dually participating in the educative process
- humanely interacting with one another

However, the theme most central to Naturalism as a philosophy of life -- nature is the only reality worth serious consideration and the human being is the apex of this reality -- is not evidenced in any of literature or claims of alternative schools.

Pragmatism

Progressive education, too, resulted from discontent with traditional education, and, it mirrors many of the dogmas of Naturalism. The organizational schema with its imposition of adult-ordered curricula and methodologies, teacher-centered classroom with teacher as transmitter, school as a markedly different institution from all other social institutions, was rejected.

Where Naturalism treated education in individualistic terms, pragmatists accentuated the social phenomenon of education. The sharing of information, experiences, viewpoints and opinions with one's fellows was tremendously important in Dewey's educational theory. The socialization of the child gained equal prominence with the intellectual development of the child. The Experimentalist's education is oriented to the public, to community criterion.

School was conceived as a miniature society based upon democratic principles which were carried out in the actual conduct of the group. Particular concern was given to overcoming conflicts. Cooperation was emphasized; competition was de-emphasized.

Experimentalists valued the marriage of education and real life, taking care to avoid the traditional dichotomy between school and home, school and world. Dewey had an aversion for what he called the "spectator theory" of knowledge. Truth, he asserted, is that which works; acts which bring favorable consequences are true, and what works can be determined by experimentation. One of his key concepts is that experience is the ideal subject matter for the method of science.

The lists of goals, curriculum, methods, and teacher/student roles cited in the Naturalism segment preceding is true also for the Progressives, but the following must be added:

Values

- cooperation (with a group)
- learning how to learn

Curriculum

- sensory awareness

Method

- democratic process
- decision making
- problem solving

Roles of Teachers and Students

- group unity

Dewey conceived education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions toward nature and fellow men. Alternative school participants agree to a limited extent, the limit being that there is inherent in the Progressive stance a preponderance of activity generated from the learner out toward nature, toward fellow beings, toward group interaction.

The similarities between Progressive schools and latter day alternatives lie more in the areas of goals, curriculum, methods, and, to a limited extent, in the roles of teacher and students, than in the area of values, origins, and organizational structure.

Existentialism

Existential philosophers write about what an existentialist school would look like if there were one. Van Cleve Morris tells us that Existentialism is

not a philosophy (in the conventional sense) and what Jaspers and Nietzsche have to say about education bears no relation whatever to their philosophical positions. Let us examine a hypothetical existentialist school then, by using the goals, curriculum, method and teacher/student roles as guides.

Goals

To the goals cited in the naturalist and progressivist section, existentialists add yet another: parent involvement. Kneller tells us that existentialists deplore the tendency of parents to surrender their educative responsibilities to schools, particularly those in which they themselves have little or no role to play.

Curriculum

As long as the content is not limited to pre-certified truths and the child-centeredness and experiential learning involves the students' and teachers' personal implications in life's situations; as long as it includes the questions of bad and good, and right and wrong, the curriculum of the naturalist and pragmatist serves our existentialist school, also. If subject matter is regarded as an end in itself or as an instrument to prepare the student for a future career, it does not embrace the existentialist's view that it must be a means for the cultivation of the self. The curriculum is not a thing to be mastered, nor to be chosen by the self of the learner, for if the emotions are not involved in the process, the learner remains an object herself. Morris calls the subject matters of traditional schools "object matters".[2]

Methods

Play would be central to the existentialist approach, as would all methods which include personal involvement in the complexities of life and freedom for the individual. The hierarchy of school authority which places students on the lowest rung would be antiehetical to the existentialist approach. Students would be free from standards imposed from without; free to extablish their own standards in terms of what they would choose to learn, and fully aware that they are doing the choosing.

Roles of Teachers and Students

The choices belong to the student; she must be responsible for them and for her own actions. The need for grades, tests, rewards and punishments is then laid waste.

The teacher's role becomes, in time, unnecessary when the student has progressed to self-determination and self-realization. The distance between student and teacher widens as the former becomes a mature self, an "authentic" individual.

Conclusion

The naturalist, pragmatist, and existentialist would be able to pick out the threads of their respective philosophies from the structure and function of today's alternative schools. If Pestalozzi could observe at, say, Clonlara School in Ann Arbor, Upland Hills Farm School in Oxford, Michigan, Santa Fe Community School, or Shaker Mountain School in Burlington, Vermont, he would, most likely feel very much at home in their day-to-day operations. The noise

levels in the classrooms, the flexibility of the schedules, the play-as-work aspects would make him feel welcome. He might even recommend more play, especially in the early elementary years. The actual involvement of parents and the democratic processes of decision-making and problem-solving might surprise him as might the ungraded mixed-age groupings of students.

If John Dewey could return for a visit to the same schools, he'd probably find solace in the emphasis on freedom and creativity, and in the adherence to the precedence extablished by Progressives: What the child produces in the classroom belongs to the child and is an expression of what she sees in the world, worked out from her own private experience. The number of experiences available for the student and the democratic processes of decision-making and problem-solving would be heartening to him. However, the accent upon the growth of the individual and the overt expression of and attention to emotional growth might give him pause as might the extent to which his "democratic process" has been stretched. The accent upon humanistic interactions between teacher and student might seem superfluous to him given his overriding concern for reason and science.

If Van Cleve Morris and George Keller were to visit the same alternative schools, they's note first the learning environment which permits unprecedented freedom of movement and choice. The potential for teachers and students to create together and the active participation of both in the structure and practices of the schools clears the way for that "genuine communion" Buber saw as essential for the discovery of subjective freedom.

Keller would applaud the fact that parents who formerly surrendered their educative responsibilities to schools where they themselves had no role to

play have assumed active roles in alternative schools as teachers or policy board members, as fundraisers or office workers.

The very origins of the schools, begun as they were by "grassroots" parents, students, and teachers (not by established educational powers) add a distinctly existentialist flavor.

The observers might note that the subject matter appears to be the means for the cultivation of self rather than the preparation for a future career, expecially in the elementary and early adolescent age groups. They may sense the attention paid to the delicate balance between growth of the self and living as a member of a group. The danger of one's unconsciously losing himself in the group, thus becoming the well-adjusted student of today and the corporation person of tomorrow is not as great as that of one's becoming independent to the point of narcissism.

The curriculum, methodology, and roles of teachers and students appear to be directed toward enabling each to become aware of self as 1) a choosing agent, 2) a free agent, and 3) a responsible agent. This is not to say that a single alternative school, nor any group of them are <u>the</u> epitome of the existentialist theory of education. It is to suggest that, overall, more of the elements of Existentialism can be detected in alternative schools than of any other philosophy, and more of them appear in every aspect of the schools' operations, structural and functional.

Perhaps Morris's question: "Can a society emerge in which each individual takes personal responsibility for the laws he obeys, the conventions he consents to, the values he appropriates for his own life?"[3] might see the beginnings of a reply in the "graduates" of the schools, in the teachers, the

directors, and the parents. If the non-public alternative schools do survive (financially) one may become "the Existentialist" school to take its place alongside Pestalozzi's Kindergarten and Dewey's Lab school.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Pat Montgomery, ed., There Ought to Be Free Choice, Clonlara Publications, Ann Arbor, 1981.

[2]Van Cleve Morris, Existentialism in Education, Harper and Row Publishers, new York, 1966.

[3]Van Cleve Morris, Existentialism in Education, Harper and Row Publishers, New York 1966, p. 103.

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

PHILOSOPHY FOR EVERYONE?

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Introduction

You see standing before you this evening one who considers himself to be well within his second life on this planet. Let me explain. I do not claim reincarnation. I merely mean to state that my present life as a professor of the philosophy of education is a second career of seventeen years duration which was superimposed on a previous career as a high school teacher of exactly the same number of years. Three years of doctoral study sandwiched between these two careers, and a four year diversion in the U.S. Army's "Brown Shoe" Air Forces during Archie Bunker's "Big One" fill the blank spots back to Pearl Harbor Day in 1941. The point of these statements is that my teaching career to this point has consisted of 17 years of high school teaching in which the emphasis was on professional practice, and 17 years of university teaching of the philosophy of education in which the emphasis has been primarily on philosophy and theory and secondarily on practice. I therefore claim credentials for speaking both as a practitioner and a theorist.

The Problem

For more than 80 years, the National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) has supported the serious study of educational issues through the preparation and distribution of yearbooks to its membership. During this time, three of these volumes have been devoted entirely to the philosophy of education, and one has dealt with the potential of philosophy for the redirection of educational research.[1]

I consider each of these four volumes to be classic, and as is probably the case with most of you, I have used them extensively as reading materials in my classes. The 1981 yearbook is edited by Jonas Soltis, who prepared the introductory chapter and one other dealing with concepts of knowledge. Nine additional chapters were prepared by members of our own parent, the Philosophy of Education Society. It is to Soltis' "Introduction" and to Harry Broudy's chapter entitled "Between the Yearbooks" that I now direct your attention.

The 1981 volume reflects the expanding perspective of philosophers of education since the middle of this century. It also reflects the movement toward greater specialization by philosophers of education, who have been consistent with the same trend in general philosophy. One result of this movement has been a tendency to think of philosophy more as a verb than as a noun, and to emphasize the use of the philosopher's highly honed skills as "ways of thinking critically about some important aspect of educating, such as moral education, equality of educational opportunity, and the nature of educational research."[2]

Soltis recognized that there is a serious mismatch between expectation and delivery, i.e., between what educational practitioners expect to be done by philosophers of education and what philosophers of education actually do. He recognizes that much of the blame for this phenomenon should be placed on the increasing professional specialization of philosophers. The main purpose of the 1981 volume was to redefine the philosophy of education in terms of its contemporary practice and to illustrate the many ways in which philosophy and education can be connected. Another objective of the volume was to:

> reflect the new state of affairs in the field in a way that could meaningfully restructure the expectations of educators with regard to the

> relation of philosophy to education, and vice-versa, if philosophy of education was to have any value for educators in the decades ahead.[3]

Broudy's chapter is a sketch of developments since the 1942 and 1955 yearbooks. As did Soltis, he elaborated the problem of the mismatch between the work of philosophers of education and expectations of professional educators, and raises the question asked by Blanshard as early as 1945 as to whether or not philosophy is too remote from the particulars of practice:

> There is ample reason, then, for taking a little time to look inward and look forward. Is our education as a whole moving in the right direction? Is philosophy playing the part it should in that education? Are those of us who teach it teaching it as we ought, and if not, is it because we are too technical, or too cut off from the world? Has philosophy any guidance to give on the great problems, moral, religious, economic, and political, that are going to trouble men's minds when they try to put together again the pieces of their world?[4]

Broudy presents a balanced perspective, recognizing that since 1955 philosophers of education have developed sophisticated new modes of inquiry, broadened and renewed their audience, and diversified their tasks. These achievements have not been without cost, he continues, for progress, fragmentation, and increasing complexity in the field have created practical problems in connecting the work of educational philosophers with the needs and expectations of professional educators, and have greatly increased the problem of communication between members of these two groups. Commenting on the recent increased emphasis on objectivity, he states that laypersons do not want their schools to be antiseptic environments separated from a concern for life's values, for: "The layman is incurably metaphysical, and if the philosophy of education ignores or merely makes fun of this need, it will be satisfied from nonphilosophical sources."[5]

Finally, Broudy states that he believes that educators have a right to expect that philosophers of education address themselves to the problems of education in general and explore how those problems impinge on schooling in a manner that does not require highly technical philosophical skills, that we should help to clarify and elucidate concepts and argument used in educational literature, that we should examine carefully proposals and policies with respect to their consequences and possibilities, that at least some of us should provide in our work "a synoptic, systematic, coherent set of beliefs and argument about education that deals with the educational enterprise as a whole and that makes connection with a philosophy of life", and that we should provide support for rational discussion and freedom of inquiry. He concludes by stating that it cannot be expected that everyone writing in the field of educational philosophy will fulfill all these expectations, but it is fair to expect that "good courses in philosophy of education will introduce students to the philosophical aspects of the major issues in education."[6]

Both Soltis and Broudy express the belief that the 1981 yearbook will be effective in correcting the problems of the mismatch between philosophers of education and professional educators. While I reiterate my strong support of the efforts of the NSSE and my colleagues who have produced this 1981 volume, and while I believe that is is a classic example of what philosophers of education do best, i.e., communicate with ourselves, I do not believe that the volume will have any significant effect in reducing the lamentable mismatch between the activities of philosophers of education and the expectations of practicing professional educators.

If it is expected that practicing educators will be influenced by this volume to restructure their expectations as to what philosophers of education can do for them, or if the volume is expected to improve communication between educational practitioners and philosophers of education, then the expectation is vain. A simple demographic fact explains the vanity of this hope. Of the approximately 4,000 members of the NSSE, about 75% (or 3,000) are professors, about 10% (or 400) are graduate students, another 10% are college and university administrators, leaving only about 5% (or 200) members who are educational practitioners such as public and private school teachers and administrators.[7] Given the facts that individual copies of this volume can be purchased and that numerous libraries around the country will have this volume in their collections, it is still evident that its readership among the more than 2-1/2 million public and private school teachers and administrators[8] will not be sufficient to expect any significant influence on restructuring their expectations. Furthermore, reasoning from a statistically insignificant number of one (myself), I doubt that many from among these educators would be challenged to read this volume even in the event that it were readily available, for educational practitioners have always tended to be more concerned with practice than with theory. If theory can be used to guide practice, so much the better, but if the choice is between theory and practice, most teachers and administrators will of necessity choose the latter:

> "Hey!" shouted Tom Gunn's mule. "Wait!" These teachers have schools now. They have to run those schools. They are practical people. Just how, specifically and precisely, would you tell them to change their schools so as to get their education right end to, as you call it?"
>
> Old Man Coyote patted a yawn with the back of his forepaw. "I lay down general principles," he said. "These school teachers have got to figure out some of the minor details themselves."[9]

A recent proposal for reforming teacher preparation by the National Education Association (NEA) also emphasizes practice over theory and raises questions as to specifically why many teachers are dissatisfied with their owr preparation for teaching:

> The NEA plan sets forth the best thinking of practicing teachersmost of them dissatisfied with their own preparation.
>
> It calls for rigorous admission standards for colleges of education, based on firm evidence of potential success as a classroom teacher; teacher preparation programs based on skills and experiences that practitioners say are necessary for effective practice; ample opportunities for education students to apply their new knowledge and skills to the 'real world' of teaching while they're still in school; teaching credentials based on multiple measures of a graduate's ability to teach; and autonomous state agencies, governed by practicing teachers, to approve teacher education programs and certify new teachers. . . .[10]

Performance based criteria for certification, teacher and student competence examinations, and other practice erosion of theory and philosophy in pre-service preparation of educational practitioners.

Assuming that we accept the thesis of Soltis and Broudy that there is indeed a mismatch between expectation of practitioner and performance of philosopher, and my thesis that the NSSE volume will do little to correct this m match, we would seem to have two classic choices: (1) ignore the problem and hope that it will disappear; or (2) identify possible alternatives for solution, choose from among the most promising, and act accordingly.[11] If we choose the former, I do not predict dire immediate calamity. I suspect that most of us will continue making our contribution ot the theory and practice of education much as we have been doing, but I see little prospect for an increasing vitality in our field.[12] It is my hope, however, that we choose the latter alternative, in which case the NSSE work should have considerable value to us, though not in the manner that Soltis and Broudy

presume. It should alert us to the problem of mismatch and to the threat that it poses to our continued growth and vitality, and it should stimulate us to begin corrective measures while hopefully thee is ample time.

Alternatives and Suggestions

As philosophers of education, I believe that we have four primary audiences to serve: (1) ourselves; (2) our doctoral candidates who hopefully will occupy positions such as ours in the future; (3) potential teachers, administrators, and other educational professionals who are in preservice preparation programs; and (4) practicing professionals in all categories who now serve in our schools and who are seeking ways of professional growth and development.

The evidence is that our performance in serving the needs of the first two of our audiences is excellent. We can take great pride in the quality and quantity of our scholarly productivity such as is found in the NSSE publication, and other scholarly publications, and in the papers read and discussed at our national and regional meetings. These are the principal ways that we communicate with ourselves, and they provide ample evidence that we have also done well over the past quarter century in preparing doctoral candidates who have made significant contributions to our fund of accumulating scholarship. If we cannot, however, improve our performance and communication with professional educators in our other two audiences, I fear that support for our programs and services will be diminished with the ultimate consequence of undercutting our performance with our first two audiences.

We must strive to maintain the quality of our scholarly research and publications as necessary to serve our first two audiences while developing means of enhancing our performance with the latter two. This is a large order, but surely it is not impossible. Broudy may have anticipated the problem by suggesting that at least some of us should deal in our writing with problems that address "the educational enterprise as a whole and that makes connection with a philosophy of life."[13] If we are convinced of a need, I believe that we can and should redirect at least a significant portion of our energy and talent both in our publications and in our classes to the task of improving communication with practicing professional educators, and to helping them to understand that philosophy and theory can provide unity, direction, and coherence to the practice of education, which now is and will remain at the center of their concern.

Presuming then that at least some of us should and do devote some of our energies to writing specifically about problems of interest to educators, it would seem that for maximum effect, these articles should appear not exclusively in our own books and journals, but in media that are commonly addressed to educational professionals.

The most effective means of addressing the needs of practicing professional educators, however, is our performance on our campuses in preservice and inservice classes and programs. We should consider the effect of developments of the past quarter century on our performance in these areas. The increased specialization that has characterized publications in the philosophy of education over the past two or three decades has tended to limit our audience to those who have the "highly honed skills" of technical

philosophy, and to narrow the spectrum of philosophical concern to problems that yield to philosophical analysis. I presume that this phenomenon has been reflected also in the teaching of our classes and in all our interactions with educational professionals. This "philosophy for the few" has treated with much more precision problems that tend to be of concern only to a few, in contrast to the much less precise treatment by the older social philosophy of subjects that are of much more concern to the "many" who may not be sufficiently sophisticated to appreciate or deal with the subjects and techniques of general philosophy, and which include many of the potential teachers, administrators, and practicing professionals who make up the latter two categories of our audiences. Is it possible to achieve a synthesis that will preserve some of our gains in precision and sophistication and simultaneously renew the vitality that characterized the philosophy of education during the first half of this century when the social philosophy of Dewey, Kilpatrick, Counts, Rugg, Bode, and others permeated the philosophy of education? It is certainly hoped that coping with our present dilemma will not precipitate a reaction that merely turns back the clock a half century to repeat the social foundations invention of Teacher's College, which was in its day an attempt to counter an earlier specialization in courses in history of education, philosophy of education etc. [14]

The recent movement toward specialization and the model of general philosophy has created other problems in communication with educators. Among these is a tendency toward the criterion of philosophy first and educator second in the preparation and selection of candidates for philosophy of education positions. To be sure, philosophers of education should be

competent as philosophers, otherwise we will again be vulnerable to charges of quackery and cracker barrel pseudo-philosophy. Of equal consideration, however, should be the insistence that those who practice our craft should make a systematic and thorough study of the problems of education. This criterion should help both to assure that the problems of education and educators remain at the core of our philosophical activity and that the philosophy of education will avoid an overemphasis on intellectual exercises and puzzles that may be of little interest to or too sophisticated for the educational practitioner. Closely related is the problem of the priorities of teaching and scholarship. With some notable exceptions, I suspect that most of us are employed primarily to teach, and are expected to be productive scholars as a means of keeping our teaching skills vital and current with the expanding fund of knowledge in our field. Some of us would probably admit reluctantly that our scholarship is superimposed on teaching and other responsibilities, and that it comes at the cost of 12 and 14 hour days and 72 hour weeks. If financial exigency should force a choice between teaching and scholarship, we should exercise great care that our teaching does not suffer unduly.

Francis Bacon observed in the seventeenth century that philosophy needed new methods of empiricism and induction to make her fertile. Perhaps American philosophy of education needs a new commitment and definition to renew her fertility among educational practitioners in the latter quarter of the twentieth century. It seems to me that the feature that most characterized our field in the first half of this century was a sharp focus not only on education as a social institution but on the problems of individuals in their

interaction with their social order. Since such concerns should be of primary importance to most of us, such a focus tends to make philosophy of education the province of everyone.[15] In sharp contrast, recent trends toward philosophy for the few appears to emphasize antiseptic objectivity over commitment to anything that smacks of subjective judgment. I do not believe that one way of life is as good as another, nor that one value is as defensible as another, but I do believe that the rational component of human intelligence can be brought to bear on basic human problems and that some form of broad consensus can be made the basis for decisions in all forms of human experience. Sophomorish as it may sound, I believe that as philosophers of education we should be committed to something -- if not to democracy then to some form of social arrangement that our intelligence convinces us is superior. I see precious little evidence that many of us today are committed to anything in the sense that Dewey, Counts, Rugg, Bode, and Brameld were committed a half century ago. I do not argue that commitment is causally related to a vital interest in society and education, but the two factors were most certainly coincident in the early part of this century.

Perhaps we should also redefine the philosophy of education in a manner more fitting to a broad participation of the many. In addressing the question of what use is philosophy to educators, Levison reasoned that as an autonomous activity such as practiced by ivory tower philosophers, it is probably of no value at all. If viewed more broadly as an institution among institutions that helps us to understand and work within the complex interrelationships of these institutions, it is of some value particularly to theorists, program planners, etc. If defined much more broadly as an expression of broad human

interests in the foundations of our beliefs, it can help the classroom teacher because it gives us training in the activity of evaluating our own beliefs and teaches us a knowledge of our own ignorance, which is an indispensable condition for improving the human mind. [16] Such a definition for the philosophy of education would be admirably suited to professional educators, and the extent to which we can fashion our activities to conform to such a broad definition may be a measure of the extent to which philosophy of education can be made vital to professional educators.

Several references are made in the NSSE publication to the increased respectability that has come as a result of the philosophy of education following more closely the increasingly specialized model of general philosophy. Doubtless we all gain because of the brilliance of those of our guild who have developed to a superlative degree those finely honed skills of general philosophy. We should remember, however, to examine our motives for the exhibition of this brilliance. Such respectability is not legitimately an end in itself -- it is a means to the end of accomplishing our total objective which includes addressing the needs not only of audiences one and two, but of three and four as well. Smith commented on the subject as follows:

> It we had been reflecting the changing styles and modes of general philosophy because we found them genuinely useful and productive in our field, then I would join . . . in approving this trend. But after a quarter of a century I have grown weary of this pathetic compulsion to attain academic respectability by imitating recent trends in general philosophy. I'm afraid that respectability, like happiness (and in spite of our Declaration of Independence) turns out to be a will-o'-the-wisp when pursued directly. It is correct that we ought to have a feeling of being at home in both philosophy and education. But even one who is a frequent house guest is generally more respected when it is clear that he has a home of his own that is in good repair. [17]

The point that brilliance is vain as an end in itself was perhaps made most pointedly by Harris:

> It is not on the statute books, but there is such a crime as indecent exposure of the mind. There is something obscence in the sight of a man who must be brilliant at all costs, who is under a compelling need to prove his intellectual superiority on every page and in every paragraph.
>
> There is fear behind all this - fear that if, for a moment, the brilliance dims, then everything is lost, the audience leaves and the author is left alone, a small and frightened man on an empty stage. It takes a long time for a brilliant man to learn that nobody is loved for his mind - but only for the human way in which he uses it.[18]

Epilogue

You have been most patient to listen to this treatise, which turns out to be an assertion that the introduction to the NSSE volume is more than anything else niapology for the increased specialization and fragmentation of the philosophy of education, and a rejection of the volume as a means of reducing the mismatch between philosophy and practice. Finally it is a plea for returning a sizable component of social philosophy and commitment to our field as a means hopefully of restoring a more healthy balance.

I believe that the NSSE yearbook is justified not on the basis of correcting a mismatch, but on the basis that it is an excellent contribution to scholarship in the philosophy of education. It needs no further justification. I also believe that the philosophy of education has become too much a servant of our own need to communicate with ourselves and to insure our immortality by training doctoral candidates to carry on similar activities when we shall have gone, as did Voltaire's Candide, to the cultivation of our gardens.

I believe that our activity as philosophers of education is justified primarily on the basis of our serving the needs of potential teachers who are in pre-service preparation programs and practicing professionals who are seeking professional growth and development. It was during a period of time when a deep concern for and a commitment to social problems dominated our field that our programs and departments were born and our services called upon for inclusion in pre-service and in-service preparation programs of educators. I believe that we have lost in the past quarter of a century much of the support that was previously given by those in charge of the preparation of our educational professionals, that overspecialization has been at least a part of the cause, and that a redirection of the philosophy of education toward the needs of everyone in our audiences rather than to the needs of a few is the best means of serving the needs of professional educators who seem to be looking in desperation for salvation in practice when they find too little hope in philosophy and theory. If we do not speak effectively to the needs of professional educators, I have serious doubt as to our ability to withstand the onslaughts of accountability, financial stringency, and the reductionist tendencies of narrow specialization.

FOOTNOTES

1. National Society for the Study of Education: The Forty-first Yearbook, Part I, Philosophies of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942)

   National Society for the Study of Education: The Fifty-fourth Yearbook, Part I, Modern Philosophies and Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955)

   National Society for the Study of Education: The Seventy-first Yearbook, Part I, Philosophical Redirection of Educational Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972)

   National Society for the Study of Education: The Eightieth Yearbook, Part I, Philosophy and Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981)

2. National Society for the Study of Education: The Eightieth Yearbook, p. 4.

3. Ibid., p. 3-4.

4. Brand Blanshard, "The Climate of Opinion," in Philosophy in American Education, ed. Blanshard et al. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945) p. 9.

5. National Society for the Study of Education: The Eightieth Yearbook, p. 27.

6. Ibid., p. 33-35.

7. Data supplied in a telephone conversation with Sally S. Levitt, Membership Secretary, National Society for the Study of Education, 5835 Kimbark Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637.

8. Digest of Educational Statistics, 1981 (Washington: National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 13 & 66).

9. Harold Benjamin, "The Cultivation of Idiocyncrasy" in American Education: An Introduction Through Readings, ed. Tyrus Hillway (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964) p. 168.

10. "NEA Proposes Reforms in Teacher Training," NEA Today, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October, 1982) p. 21.

11. John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1933).

12. If we choose to continue doing what we are doing much as we are presently doing it, I would suggest that we give maximum support to the efforts of groups such as the Committee on Academic Standards and Accreditation of the American Educational Studies Association who are seeking wider acceptance of standards for foundations courses in teacher preparation programs.

13. National Society for the Study of Education: The Eightieth Yearbook, p. 35.

14. Philip G. Smith, "A Response to President Soltis," Educational Theory, Vol. 25, No.3 (Summer, 1975), p. 223.

15. At least to the extent that we think of philosophy as a process of straight thinking (Bertrand Russell), or as the stubborn attempt to think clearly (William James), it would seem that philosophy can be practiced by almost everyone, and in an increasing hierarchy of sophistication by those who wish to develop the knowledge and skills to do so.

16. Arnold B. Levison, "The Uses of Philosophy and the Problems of Educators," Educational Theory, Vol. 11, No. 4 (April, 1961), pp. 123-218.

17. Smith, Ibid., p. 225.

18. Sidney J. Harris, "Indecent Exposure of the Mind." The Des Moines Register, September 23, 1967, p. 4.

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MAINSTREAM EDUCATION FOR OLDER PEOPLE
A Philosophical Justification

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In accordance with the democratic ideals of the United States, all public schools and many private schools have become increasingly inclusive institutions in the course of history. The trend has been toward including all groups of people within the fold of formal education. Schooling was at first accorded only to well-to-do males, but step by step over the years it was extended to other groups: the poor, females, blacks and other ethnic groups, the handicapped, the very young, and young and middle-aged adults. Schooling for all--universal education--has been the boast and to a considerable degree the reality in our society. The term universal education, it is true, has usually referred to compulsory education of youth. I maintain that at all levels schools should be as open to older people as to youth and that as much as possible older people and younger people should attend the same classes. Thus the term mainstream education, as I shall use it, refers to the main educational institutions in our society and to age-integrated groups of learners.

I maintain further that older people have been excluded from much of formal education, especially at elementary and secondary levels, for the same reasons other groups were excluded in the past. Like the poor, women, blacks, and the handicapped, older people have been thought of as mentally deficient and as not needing formal, certificate-granting education. They have been

thought of as not mixing well with other groups and thus in need of separate, segregated education of an informal, undemanding nature. Since other groups once excluded from formal education for about the same reasons have now been granted access to mainstream formal education, I maintain that older people too should be granted all mainstream educational opportunities. At the college level, it is already happening. Increasing numbers of older people are going to colleges and universities to seek degrees and job training. Elementary and secondary schools too should increasingly assume responsibility for the education of people of all chronological ages. Educational theorists should think, talk, and write about education without age limits; educational practitioners should do education without age limits.

If it is asked why the group of older people was not included in formal education in the past at all levels, the answer is clear: this group did not exist in large numbers until fairly recently. If it is asked why this rapidly growing group of older people is not included at all levels of formal education at present, the answer is that schools, like all institutions, change slowly and find themselves today out of synchronization in many ways with the needs of an aging population.

Some may object to the comparison of other groups--the poor, females, blacks, the handicapped--to the growing group of older people on the basis that education, almost by definition and certainly by common practice, refers only or mainly to children and youth. I do not deny that education has commonly meant education of the young, but the philosophical assumptions behind formal education of the young, I shall argue, point to the need today for a view of formal education as lifelong. The first philosophical assumption to be considered is this: school education is preparation for life.

Education as Preparation for Life

The view of education as preparation for successful living is reflected in the advice parents, educators, and people generally often give young people: "Stay in school. It will pay off." Yet there is evidence that formal education does not always pay off. A study of vocational programs in this country by the National Institute of Education reports no "compelling evidence supporting the labor-market benefits of high-school vocational education." The growing numbers of unemployed high-school and college graduates add to the evidence that formal education does not assure jobs or job success. Common sense and research studies point to many other factors that influence one's success in life: heredity, sex, race, education and socioeconomic status of parents, economic conditions in the nation, and just plain luck. Despite the complex of factors influencing jobs and life success, many Americans keep their faith in formal education as preparation for jobs and successful living.

This common view of education as preparation may seem to exclude older people from formal education. Preparation is for a future, presumably a rather long future. Therefore, education as life preparation would appear to be primarily for children and youth. They have a future; old people do not. Or do they? Do 65-year-olds have a future in this world? Certainly they do today. Increasing numbers of them will live in good health for another 20 years. Many of them need preparation for new jobs. Many thousands who lack functional literacy need education as preparation for future living as citizens and workers. It seems clear to me that the concept of education as preparation for future life can apply to older people as well as to youth. The only strong argument for denying preparatory formal education to older

people would seem to be that their future is shorter than that of youth. They will have less time in which to contribute to life and to enjoy life. It would appear equally unjust, however, to deny formal education to a young person with only a few years to live because of an incurable disease and to an old person with only a few years to live because of age.

Some argue that the concept of education as preparation for life, although widely supported, is faulty. Philosopher-educator John Dewey is perhaps the most famous American critic of education as preparation for life. In Democracy and Education he wrote:

> What is to be prepared for is, of course, the responsibilities and privileges of adult life. Children are not regarded as social members in full and regular standing. They are looked upon as candidates; they are placed on the waiting list. The conception is only carried a little farther when the life of adults is considered as not having meaning on its own account, but as a preparatory probation for "another life."[1]

Instead of education as preparation, Dewey viewed education as growth leading to more growth: a process, not an end. He defined education as "a continuous process of groth, having as its aim at every stage an added capacity of growth."[2] Although he saw education as much broader than schooling, he did view--and discuss--schooling as a part of the education of young people. Since there were not great numbers of people over 65 when he wrote Democracy and Education, first copyrighted in 1916, he apparently did not feel the need to deal with the subject of education for older people. In a later book--Problems of Men, copyrighted in 1946 and republished as Philosophy of Education, he wrote:

> I may say that our present system is highly defective in opportunities for directed continuation of education. It is no disparagement of present efforts in "adult education" to say that the continued education of those who have left school should long ago have been made a paramount interest of public education.[3]

Although it is not clear that "public education" means "public schooling," it is clear that Dewey's concept of education as continuous growth rather than as preparation for future life applies to people of all chronological ages.

Many other educators have objected to the view of education as practical preparation for life, particularly for work, for a somewhat different reason: they see education as an end in itself rather than as a means to some utilitarian end such as employment. My purpose here is not to argue for a nonutilitarian view of education (although it seems to me the proper view). My argument is rather than both the common view of education as preparation for life and the view of education as growth or as an end in itself justify the formal education of older people. Older people need preparatory education--for high school or college, for jobs, for citizenship, for family living, for leisure time. Older people need to keep growing intellectually. However one views formal education--as a means or as an end, it should be made fully and equally available to older people as well as to younger people.

It should be remembered that in the United States, formal education with compulsory school attendance developed at a time of large-scale industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. It was a time when there were many young people and few old people, certainly very few in their 60s, 70s, and 80s. Formal education of youth with compulsory school attendance, it was said, was necessary for the welfare of the state--to train good workers and to "serve as a security against crime, misery, loss of property, and disregard for law and order."[4] Today, when faith in the social benefits of education is not so great and when the numbers of old people are increasing rapidly as the numbers of young people decrease in the United States, it would

seem possible for formal education to become universal in the sense of being fully open to older as well as younger people. Compulsion is surely not appropriate for older people (and not even for younger people, according to some social critics[5]), but mainstream formal education without compulsion is appropriate for older people, including those over 65. It is not ony appropriate but necessary according to a second major philosophical assumption underlying education in the United States: Everyone should have an equal opportunity to be educated. It is this equal-opportunity assumption that I shall consider next.

Equal Opportunity to Education

What is meant by "equal opportunity"? Herbert J. Gans defines it as "the right of every person to get ahead without hindrance by reason of race, sex, age, and parental social position."[6] Applying that definition to education, one might say that equal opportunity is the right of every person to get educated without hindrance by reason of race, sex, age, and parental social position. Is it proper to substitute "to get educated" for "to get ahead"? Are they the same, or closely linked? Throughout American history many people have thought that education and getting ahead are closely linked. It is true that today the connection between schooling and economic success has been questioned, as indicated earlier. According to a study by Mary Corcoran and Christopher Jencks, it is "to a large extent the status of the family [that] determines the education of the child, which in turn determines his status."[7] Nonetheless, "it is still true . . . that the best indicator of ecomonic success--among men at least--is how much education a man has

had."[8] Since this study was limited to men, it does not say anything about the economic success of women. Furthermore, like most studies of the connection between schooling and economic success, it is based on an assumption that all or most schooling is preparation of youth for mature life and the study does not relate specifically to the education or economic life of those over 65. If it is accepted that there is some connection between schooling and economic success and if it is accepted that older people need jobs, job training, and economic success, then preparatory education offered to younger people should also be offered to older people.

The need of older people for continuing employment and for education is beginning to be recognized. The Age Discrimination Act was passed by the United States Congress in 1975 to allow older people "access to economic opportunity."[9] At least at higher levels of education because of declining youth enrollments, older students are being actively recruited. Yet most institutions of higher education still omit "age" from their printed statements about equal educational opportunity. Here is an example:

> Elmhurst College . . . admits qualified students without regard to sex, race, religion, handicap, or national or ethnic origin.[10]

It will be noted that "age" is absent from this statement. In contrast is the following statement:

> Saint Xavier College admits qualified students without regard to religion, race, sex, color, handicap, age and national or ethnic origin.[11]

It will be noted that "age" is included among the factors not to be considered in admitting qualified students. Community colleges in particular are likely to include "age" in their nondiscriminatory statements since they strongly recruit older students. For example, Triton College in River Grove, Illinois, has the following statement in its class schedules:

> It is the policy of Triton College not to discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, national origin, handicap, age, sex, or marital status in admission to and participation in its educational programs, employment policies, or College activities.[12]

Colleges like Saint Xavier and Triton point the way to recognized and advertised equal educational opportunity for everyone of every chronological age.

The word "equal," to be sure, is not easy to define as it relates to educational opportunity. Does it mean "affirmative action"--giving advantage to groups greatly discriminated against in the past? Students like Allan Bakke have gone to court to challenge affirmative-action college admission policies. It has been maintained that Bakke was denied entrance to medical school primarily because of age rather than race.[13] Other students are going to court to challenge directly admission policies that discriminate on the basis of age. For example, 52-year-old Frances Purcie sued the University of Utah for denying her admission to graduate school, charging that openings in the school were reserved for younger students.[14]

Thus equal opportunity to education is increasingly being demanded by and for older people. However difficult it may be to define "equal" and however impossible it may be to make educational opportunities genuinely equal, the country's historic commitment to equal educational opportunity would seem to require at least that the doors of formal education be fully open to members of all groups in our society, including the growing group of those over 65.

The federal government has formally recognized the right of older people to education in the Lifelong Learning Act of 1976, the first federal statute dealing specifically with the education of older people.[15] It hardly seems likely that lifelong education, which remained unfunded under the

administration of former President Carter, will be funded under the present administration (1982). For possible future implementation, however, the Lifelong Learning Act does offer a statement of federal support for the idea that "American society should have as a goal the availability of appropriate opportunities for lifelong learning for all its citizens without regard to restrictions of previous education or training, sex, age, handicapping condition, social or ethnic background, or economic circumstance."[16]

Some may argue that older people have already had their equal opportunity to education in their youth. The fact is that many older people in this country had no formal education at all, or very little. The number of total illiterates (especially among the old) and functional illiterates (among younger and older adults) in the United States testifies to lack of adequate educational opportunity in the past. This statement is based on the assumption--a correct one, I believe--that most people can become literate if given adequate schooling. It is based also on the recognition that school in the United States has been far from adequate for many people, especially those belonging to economically disadvantaged groups.

There is a legal precedent for providing educational opportunities for adults who were denied education as children. In the case of Lebanks vs. Spears, "the court addressed the issue of whether persons harmed by a previous denial of their right to education had a right to compensatory education. The Lebanks court ordered that education and training opportunities be made available to mentally retarded persons 'over twenty-one years of age who were not provided educational services when children.'"[17] Although this decision applies to mentally retarded adults denied education as children, it does

suggest that a successful legal case might be made for providing education and training for any adults, including those over 65, who had no education--or very little or very inadequate education--as children and who can be shown to have been harmed by their lack of an equal opportunity to education.

Many would argue, however, that "education" in "equal opportunity to education" means only preparatory education for future life and that older people have no need for such preparatory education. I argued earlier that many older people need preparation for work and other life activities as much as do younger people because older people do indeed have futures. Older people have the same basic needs as younger people, and these needs require equal opportunity to employment and education.

Equal educational opportunity is built into the structure of formal education in the United States. Recent legislation requiring mainstreaming of the handicapped[18] is evidence of the active concern for equality of opportunity in education. The only large group still not accorded equal educational opportunity in all mainstream educational institutions is the rapidly growing group of older people. It has been said that in formal education "racism is in retreat; sexism is everywhere on the defensive. But 'ageism' is still growing."[19] It would seem a matter of justice to extend equal educational opportunity to all older people. That statement introduces another philosophical assumption underlying American education: everyone should be treated justly and as a person of dignity and worth.

Justice and Human Dignity

In the words of John Rawls, justice is "the first virtue of social institutions."[20] Since Rawls in his book A Theory of Justice has stimulated much thinking about and discussion of the concept of justice, I wish to consider what he says about justice that might relate to the education of older people. Rawls develops a theory of justice in which "all social values--libery and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect--are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage. Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all."[21] For Rawls,

> [although] equality of opportunity means an equal chance to leave the less fortunate behind in the personal quest for influence and social position ... resources for education are not to be allotted solely or necessarily mainly according to their return as estimated in productive trained abilities, but also according to their worth in enriching the personal and social life of citizens, including here the less favored. As a society progresses the latter consideration becomes increasingly more important.[22]

How might these ideas be used to justify equal educational opportunity for older people? Rawls would seem to be saying that the social value of formal education is to be distributed equally to all, including those over 65, unless an unequal distribution--with little or no formal education for older people, for example--is to the advantage of everyone, including older people. The denial of equal educational opportunity to older people is justified only if the public generally benefits from such denial.

Can one argue that denying some 24 million Americans over 65 an equal opportunity to be literate and liberally educated or to be educated for citizenship or to be trained for jobs is to the benefit of all Americans of all ages? Most people would agree, it seems to me, that it is not beneficial

to society at large for such a large and growing group of people (those over 65) to be denied, or discouraged from seeking, education at all levels and of all kinds. With regard to vocational training, some may point out that it is unfair to younger people to ask them to support older people capable of employment and desiring the training or retraining that would make employment possible. Furthermore, some may argue, we need the productive contributions of older Americans. Even if one discounts the potential productive contributions of older Americans, Rawls reminds us that we must include among the benefits to society the "enriching [of] the personal and social life of citizens." "As a society progresses," he affirms, "the latter consideration becomes increasingly more important."[23]

The Rawls theory of justice would seem to justify clearly equal educational opportunity for older people. In fact, no theory of justice, it seems to me, can deny equal educational opportunity to older people except a theory that incorporates a view of older people as of less value than younger people because of the likely shorter future of older people. Those who hold such a theory either openly or implicitly would seem to base their argument on instrumental value. I suggest that it is difficult if not impossible to measure the instrumental value of a person of any age over any period of time. Even if one accepts the argument that on the whole older people have less instrumental value than younger people, are people to be valued, like things, by their utility? Are people to be valued as means to ends? I maintain that people are valuable in themselves--as ends, not as means. In the view of Immanuel Kant, "we value other people <u>because</u> they are other. The proper, sane, and rational way to view them ... is as ends in themselves, not

as means to any ends or ours, however, exalted."[24] Kant preferred to restrict the use of the word "value" to refer to things since "value" suggests usefulness as a means to an end. Kant saw people--people of all chronological ages--as having, not usefulness, but something very different: dignity.

Many other philosophers as well as many religious and political leaders have proclaimed the dignity of all human beings of all chronological ages. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the dignity and basic rights of all people, including the right to education "directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity."[25] In the United States, it has been proclaimed that "the essential nature of all men is the same and ... no man has a greater (or lesser) degree of humanity than any other. And this much being granted, it follows that despite any differences in strength or wealth or intellectual acumen, all men have the same human dignity and all possess the same inalienable rights."[26] This statement presumably refers to all women as well as men and to people of all chronological ages. The meaning is clear: all people have equal dignity and the same basic rights.

If it is argued that in education one must distinguish between instrumental education and intrinsic education and that, without denying an older person's dignity, one can deny him or her instrumental education, such as job training, I would point out again that in our society a job, or at least an opportunity for employment, seems essential to the dignity of an adult of any chronological age. I would point out further that in our educational system it is difficult to separate education that prepares for jobs from education that does not prepare for jobs.

To conclude, I quote the words of historial Robert E. Potter: "Two of the American ideals which go back to colonial days and which have become increasingly important are the concepts of individual worth and universal educational opportunity. Any educational policy that ignores these ideals is inconsistent with the over-all development of American education and American life in general."[27] Support of these ideals requires, I maintain, the acceptance of older people along with younger people as the rightful responsibility of all formal, mainstream, credential-giving institutions in the United States.

Footnotes

[1]John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 54.

[2]Ibid.

[3]John Dewey, Philosophy of Education (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1975), p. 91.

[4]Encyclopedia of Education, Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1971), s.v. "Compulsory Attendance," by Peter P. DeBoer, p. 377.

[5]Ibid., p. 379. "... there are social critics who questions the very notion of compulsory attendance. Some believe that the twentieth-century phenomenon of prolonging the school-leaving age has been a bane rather than a blessing. They argue that the extension of compulsory attendance into the later teen-age years was largely a power of labor unions. The results, they say, have brought little benefit to the laboring man, loss to the general public, and damage to the schools (the last the result of the unwise attempt to force inappropriate schooling upon rebellious youth)."

[6]Herbert J. Gans, More Equality (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 63.

[7]Ellen Goodman, "'The Great Equalizer' Is Off Balance," Chicago Sun-Times, 11 September 1979, p. 37.

[8]Ibid.

[9]William Hines, "U.S. Proposes Rules to Stamp Out Age Discrimination," Chicago Sun-Times, 1 December 1978, p. 2..

[10]Chicago Tribune, 25 November 1979, sec. 6, p. 11. Elmhurst College is located in Elmhurst, Illinois.

[11]Ibid., p. 4. Saint Xavier College is located in Chicago.

[12]1980 Spring Class Schedule (River Grove, Illinois: Triton College, 1980), p. 3.

[13]"Why Allan Bakke Was Turned Down," Chicago Sun-Times, 24 September 1978, p. 3.

[14]"Rising Median Age Is Affecting Education at All Levels," New York Times, 8 January 1978, education sec., p. 10. "A brief cited a ruling by a federal court that discrimination against older people to provide spaces for younger ones violated the Constitution."

[15]Richard E. Petersn and Associates, Lifelong Learning in America (San Francisco: Joseey-Bass Publishers, 1979), p. 298.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Paul R. Friedman, The Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (New York: Avon Books, 1976), p. 103.

[18]See Susan E. Hasazi, Paul D. Rice, and Robert York, Mainstreaming: Merging Regular and Special Education (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1979).

[19]David Hackett Fischer, Growing Old in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 211.

[20]John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 3.

[21]Ibid., p. 62.

[22]Ibid., pp. 106-7.

[23]Ibid., p. 107.

[24]Immanuel Kant's view as paraphrased in Mary Midgley, Beast and Man, The Roots of Human Nature (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 354.

[25]Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights, the United States, and World Community (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 65.

[26]Charles A. Fecher, Mencken: A Study of His Thought (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 174.

[27]Robert E. Potter, The Stream of American Education (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1967), p. 5.

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ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AS AN EXERCISE IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

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The majority of our students who take philosophy of education at Kansas State University are not, and are never going to be, classroom teachers or philosophers of education. Administrators--practicing and in training--constitute our graduate audience.

With this in mind we have, over the last two years, included in our coursework an analysis of various organizational and administrative theories. Using the tools of philosophical analysis we address the following kinds of questions:

> How does the theory address human needs and employ motivational strategies? What is the place of the individual in the organization or workplace?
>
> How does the theory view change?
>
> What does the theorist see as the attributes of formal organization?

These are some of the questions we will address in this short discussion, but there are others that play a central role in our instructional endeavors. For example, we are interested in the moral or ethical claims made by the proponents of the systems under examination. Also, we attempt to discover if these views/theories simply address procedural matters or substance. That is, are they mainly cookbooks of organizational administration, or, are the assumptions grounded in something more than actual practice? It is our thinking that attention to the claims of organizational and administrative theoriticians gives our work in philosophy of education an additional focus. The argument we make is that the organization and administration of education is as fruitful an area for philosophical inquiry as the traditional teacher-learner-curriculum discussion.

As an example of our work we will examine two widely studied theories of organizational management using as our general outline some of the questions presented above.

Two theories that we address, which are representative of educational administrative theory, are the Grid approach (originally Managerial Grid) developed by Robert R. Blake with Jane S. Mouton and System 4 conceived by Rensis Likert and further elaborated by David Bowers.[1] Each of these theories had its origin in the private sector in the early 1960's but both, in the intervening decades, have been expanded and implemented with an educational focus. They are each inductive and both descriptive and prescriptive. Before proceeding with our examination, we will briefly outline some major attributes of these theories.

Blake and Mouton's Grid theory suggests numerous possible styles of management but concentrates on the five which are at the ends of the Grid's axes and at the center. The theory is built upon the assumption that management practices have two predominant dimensions: "concern for people" and "concern for production". (See Figure 1). A manager's "style," then, is the point on the Grid where internal and external pressures are at an equilibrium for that person, somewhat of a Gestaltist view.

The 9,1 style (Authority-Obedience) is epitomized by the person who is primarily concerned with task achievement and who demands subordinates' obedience. Conflict is managed through suppression of dissent. Conversely, country-club management (1,9) exhibits very little concern for production. Direction and control are based on the concept that people should be shown rather than commanded. "Thoughtful attention to needs of people for

satisfying relationships leads to a comfortable, friendly organization and work tempo", but with little productivity.[2] 1,1 management, labeled "impoverished" by Blake and Mouton, is found when the manager neither provides supervision for employees nor cares if they like him/her. These people exert the minimum possible effort necessary to prevent being discharged from the organization. "Organization Man" might describe the 5,5 manager. He/she balances production with the maintenance of group morale, without overly emphasizing either. Conflict is handled through compromise, but only when "sitting it out" doesn't work.

The best management style, according to Blake and Mouton, and the one for which organizations should strive, is that of team management: 9,9. Here people are integrated with production: it is the worker who determines the conditions and strategies of the workplace. Relationships of trust and respect develop in this setting. Communication is open, authentic, and candid. Conflict is managed through confrontation. 9,9 management has much in common with Art Brown's arguments for participatory democracy[3] and Carnoy and Shearer's comments about democracy in the workplace.[4]

Whereas, Blake and Mouton theorize that effective organization is the result of high concern for both production and people, Likert's model (See Figure 2) portrays effectiveness as a function of the climate for organizational decision-making. Organizations, then, can be assessed and placed on a continuum ranging from System 1: Exploitive-Authoritative to System 4: Participative. Likert, too, uses a descriptive assessment as the basis for a prescriptive theory.

In System 1 an organization's control and direction is concentrated at the top of the organization. There is little upward or lateral communication although attempts at downward communication (usually in terms of orders) may exist. The lack of effectiveness in System 1 organizations is partially a function of this lack of communication: decisions are made without all necessary data.[5]

"Benevolent-Authoritative" systems are slightly more democratic than System 1. There is still little upward or lateral communication, but there is a great deal of downward communication. Goals continue to be set at the top although subordinates may be allowed comment. Likert, and others, consistently find most organizations at System 2. This certainly appears to be the case in most elementary and secondary schools.

"Consultative" organizations (System 3) are considerably more broadbased than System 2. Although policy decisions are made at the top, there is allowance for decision making at lower echelons of the organization. Communication, in all directions, is usually good. Cooperative teamwork is evident in moderate amounts. System 3 is often found in colleges and universities.[6]

Likert theorizes that a fourth System called "Participative" is most effective. The primary attribute of System 4 is the implementation ot the "principle of supportive relationships":

> The leadership and other processes of the organization must be such as to ensure a maximum probability that in all interaction and all relationships with the organization each member will, in the light of his background, values, and expectations, voice and experience as supportive and one which builds and maintains his sense of personal worth and importance.[7]

Additionally, for a manager to perform his supervisory functions satisfactorily he must be able to exert influence upon his superiors through a system of "linking pins". System 4 organizations, then, have an open communication system whereby decisions are made through cooperative teamwork.

Having established the basic assumptions of these theories, let us address the questions we raised earlier. Of particular concern to us is: how does the theory address man's needs in a Maslovian manner and interrelate motivation with needs attainment? Likert's System 4 contains a multi-dimensional view of motivation that relates to all of man's motivational forces except fear.[8] Not only are economic motives addressed, but attention is also given to "ego" motives: the desire to achieve and maintain a sense of personal worth and importance as well as the desire for status, recognition, approval, acceptance and power; the "security" motives; and higher level motives such as "curiosity, creativity, and the desire for new experiences".[9] Responsibility is strongly encouraged; trust is prevalent. The 9,9 management style establishes "accomplishment and contribution...as the critical aspect of ...individual motivation."[10] The basic motivation of the 9,9 administrator is "contribution; a fulfillment of self through expression in work activities and in relationships with others which are characterized by respect and trust".[11] The 9,9 style balances the need for contribution with an attitude of caring. Optimum motivation, then, is consistent with the 9,9 themes: production and people.

Complementing this view of motivation is the theorists' concept of man in the workplace. System 4 advocates have certain assumptions about the nature of man and his desires which are channeled into how they portray the

productive organization. They maintain "that each person wants appreciation, recognition, influence, a feeling of accomplishment, and a feeling that people who are important to him believe in him and respect him".[12] In the workplace, an individual's performance is based on his/her level of skills, his/her concept of what it is that he/she is supposed to do and his/her will to do it. "A management system which denies him influence, appreciation, respect, and confidence diminishes his motivation to be a contributing member of the organization; a management system which provides those positive conditions enhances it."[13] Blake and Mouton see individuals as motivated by "service, altruism, or making a worthwhile contribution."[14] For the individual to be most productive he/she must identify with a larger cause (the purposes of the organization) and internalize these. "It is the character of human behavior that people identify with and work toward the achievement of broader objectives in contrast with objectives narrowly defined as self-interests."[15] In the well-managed organization, organizational success and personal contribution to it become synonymous. Melding these two concepts is a goal of 9,9 management.

The second question we ask is: How do the theorists view change? Contemporary views of change lie along a continuum between nonintervention and radical intervention with laissez-faire economic theory exemplifying the former and Marxian analysis the latter. Likert and Blake and Mouton take a middle position in this continuum: they both believe in planned change. Lippitt[16] sees planned change as a conscious, deliberate, and collaborative effort to improve the operations of a human system through the use of valid knowledge.

Both Likert's System 4 and Blake and Mouton's 9,9 management are anchored in the belief that organizations can and must change. Change occurs when the organization becomes cognizant that it is no longer effectively attaining its goals or successfully articulating its mission. They do so by "creating ... more rational problem-solving systems through which groups of individuals establish new norms, role definitions, and operating procedures".[17] This is indeed the thrust of these two theories: Blake and Mouton establishing cooperative teams moving onward to 9,9 management; Likert using "linking pins" and small group interactions to facilitate a change in administrative orientations more approximating System 4.

Thirdly, we examine how the theorist views the concept of formal organization. Educational institutions occupy a position in organizational theory that is a conundrum of sorts. Although they certainly are formal organizations of the bureaucratic type, they also are violative ot many of the constructs of bureaucracy. Perhaps the most significant aberration is that of hierarchical expertise. Traditionally, every superior has been expertise than each peson he/she supevises. However, in schools, as in other organizations statfed by professionals, this is not the case. In these organizations attention must be given to views about both formal and informal organizational structure. Generally, formal organizations are characterized by a delineated purpose, cooperation among members, and internal communication networks. Likert and Blake and Mouton are well versed in these attributes. They tie the success of any planned change to the initial acceptance by the organizational hierarchy, then, to transmission through the organization.

According to Likert, a fundamental problem with ineffective formal organization is that channels for interaction and influence circumvent the formal structure and are effective only on an informal basis. There is strong concern that the formal and informal processes ot interaction and influence mesh. System 4, then, works best in organizations that are ineffective in attaining their stated purposes (such as many educational organizations). It alters non-performance through increased cooperation and communication. Cooperation is improved by training employees to engage in teamwork through their work "families". For System 4, "the basic building block (of the organization) is the face-to-face group."[18] Communication is improved until it becomes free-flowing in all directions.

Blake and Mouton view the formal organization as characterized by people, purpose, hierarchy, and "culture".[19] Organizational "culture" is the culmination of all of the past practices of the organization. The Grid approach integrates people and purposes--i.e., production, thereby improving the organizational "culture".

The major difference between the System 4 and Grid views of formal organizations is the Grid's emphasis on redefining the organization into an "ideal" type. Whereas System 4 seeks to alter the organization when necessary to effect better communication and cooperation; the Grid requires restructuring the organization to fit the 9,9 orientation.

Finally, we direct our students to perhaps the more fundamental question: Are these really theories? We address this question in light of the framework established by Abraham Kaplan[20] especially his discourses on the validation of theory and theory in the behavioral sciences. The theories that we have

presented here we believe meet the test of "correspondence": they each complement our accumulated knowledge about human motivation and organizational behavior. They are also coherent. Likert, distilled, proposes individual involvement in organizational decision-making as the key to effective organizations. Blake and Mouton see concern for people coupled with concern for production as the basis for organizational effectiveness. Each theory is functional; and this in more than the sense of successful application, although both have been successful in limited settings. Likert and Blake and Mouton have raised several questions regarding the constructs of the human relations school of management. They have served as instigators of serious discussion in the field in several directions including: the extent to which participatory management can be realized; the dominance of one system or style at different levels of organization; and, perhaps more importantly, the extent to which people should or can be "manipulated" within an organizational setting.

What, then, is the purpose of our examining management theories in philosophy of education?

1. To introduce our students to the utilization of philosophical analysis as a viable method in their professional lives.
2. To encourage them to look for weaknesses, contradictions, and incoherence in different approaches to management.
3. To learn to examine what is purported to be theory using objective criteria.
4. To define, for themselves, a philosophy of administration.

Footnotes

[1]Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid (Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1964), Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), and David G. Bowers, Systems of Organizations: Management of the Human Resource (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1976).

[2]Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Versatile Manager: A Grid Profile (Homewood: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1980), p. 75.

[3]Arthur Brown, "President's Address: Institutional Democracy: Problems: Prospects" in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Midwest Philosophy of Educators Society, 1978.

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[7]Likert, 1961, p. 103.

[8]Bowers, p. 105.

[9]Likert, 1961, p. 98.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Blake and Mouton, 1964, p. 172.

[12]Bowers, p. 4.

[13]Bowers, p. 5.

[14]Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, Building a Dynamic Corporation Through Grid Organization Development (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 63.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ronald A. Lippitt and others, Dynamics of Planned Change (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1958).

[17]Crowfoot, p. 191.

[18]Bowers, p. 3.

[19]Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Academic Administrator Grid (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1981), p. 177.

[20]Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964).

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ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: SOME FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES

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The contention of this paper is that the extent to which an individual is held accountable the more difficult it is to be personally responsible. "Accountability" and "responsibility" are opposing concepts, even though many educational thinkers equate the two. Stanley Elam, for example, defines accountability as being "responsible for. . . prespecified behavior."[1] If one's behavior is prespecified, it does not make sense to claim one is responsible for behavior.

There is a major difference between the concept of accountability and that of responsibility. One says, for example, "I have a sense of responsibility;" while, "I have a sense of accountability," sounds odd. Why? Well, accountability is prespecified behavior; responsibility is not.[2] One is usually accountable to something or to someone; while one is usually responsible for something or for someone. Accountability means "being subject to giving an account;" while responsibility means "being answerable as the primary cause, motive or agent." Accountability means "capable of being accounted to;" and responsibility means "having the character of a free moral agent," or "capable of determining one's own acts."

Thus, accountability and responsibility differ in fundamental ways: accountability implies external sanctions and controls; responsibility implies internal sanctions and controls. The more one is held accountable, the less his area of responsibility is increased, for one must merely consult some external, prespecified model and act accordingly. Accountable action can be

mindless. To be responsible, though, implies a process of deliberation where the individual assesses various aspects of subsequent action. A responsible person considers his intention, the nature of the act, and its consequences; while an accountable individual merely checks the appropriate or correct standard or model.

Accountability is a beneficial system if one wants someone else to tell them what's expected; responsibility is surely more difficult, for one can never be as certain about his area of responsibility as he/she can concerning the area of accountability. A system of accountability gets diminishing returns, for it is easy to "do the minimum to satisfy one's accountability."[3] But the individual works out and develops his responsibility in "fear and trembling."

Accountability is likewise a limiting concept, for there are only certain areas for which one can be held accountable. There has been much written in the literature concerning the impossibility of measuring the so-called affective components of education; for instance, a teacher can be held accountable for developing skills and information, but how can teachers be held accountable for building rapport with students or for treating students as persons? How are these characteristics measured? I don't think that they can be strictly measured, but they can be evaluated. For example, if the students do not react posibively to the teacher most of the time, it is obvious that there is little rapport between student and teacher.

Some critics distinguish between education and schooling. Education is thought to be a broader term covering incidental learning as well as the development of the process of socialization. Schooling refers to the

development of skills and the acquisition of information. The more teachers are held accountable, the more education becomes schooling, for incidental learning cannot be strictly measured. The more education is equated with schooling, the more rigid and structured it becomes. This is precisely one of the criticisms of the contemporary educational process of such thinkers and Paul Goodman and Ivan Illich. Thus, an emphasis on accountability leads to an emphasis on schooling, not education.

Let's examine a number of cases in which the accountability-responsibility distinction becomes evident. It is my contention that the term "accountable" applies to certain professions but not to others. A soldier is held accountable, for example, because he is part of a hierarchical structure. The captain gives an order, and the private acts accordingly. The soldier's areas of accountability are specified by one in authority. At times the soldier's accountability may interfere with his responsibility. If the captain gives an immoral order to shoot civilians, the soldier has a moral right to ask questions. The Calley case during the Viet Nam War is a good illustration of such a conflict. But, in most instances, a soldier's areas of accountability are accepted by tradition, and the question of responsibility never enters in.

Let's turn to the issue of motherhood. In what ways can a mother be held accountable? Parents are legally accountable for caring for their children. A mother violates the law if she deprives her child of the necessities of life, thus causing severe mental or physical hardship on him. Cruel treatment, such as inflicting sever physical pain, is also a violation of the law. Except for cases in which legality specifies accountability, does it make sense to hold a mother accountable for the proper development of her

children? Notwithstanding the difficulty of developing standards to measure such growth, it does seem that motherhood cannot be programmed. Certainly, a mother could be held accountable for certain basic aspects of child development, but, beyond this, it is difficult to imagine how this degree of accountability would be initiated. One could imagine the case where the mother took "correct" care of her child but did not display any love. If this were the case, children could be raised more efficiently by "professional mothers" who could be held accountable. Thus, the term "accountable" does not seem to apply to motherhood.

Yet, in the case of the policeman, it does apply. A policeman is held accountable by his superiors, for there are proper procedures to follow when arresting an individual and correct ways to go about doing one's duty. A policeman is also responsible for the fair treatment of individuals. Let's assume that a policeman has a quota of tickets to issue for a certain month. So he tickets individuals driving cars with out-of-town license plates who haven't really violated speed or safety laws. Such persons would be unlikely to appear in court to protest the ticket. In this example, the policeman may be acting irresponsibly but accountably. The policeman example is closer to the soldier than to the mother, for a policeman is restricted by numerous legal and departmental regulations and procedures. It makes more sense, then, to talk about the accountability of a policeman rather than his responsibility.

Lastly, take the example of an artist. Is an artist accountable or responsible to his profession? In what sense is a painter accountable? Or a poet? They also are legally accountable for using their talent in an acceptable way, although today it's difficult to imagine how an artist could

violate the law through the medium of his art. Of course, if an artist used a human body in a destructive fashion in the creation of a work of his art, he or she would be legally accountable. But, usually, we talk about the responsibility of the artist. The matter of taste, for example, is largely a subjective matter for the artist. The artist is responsible for the development and expression of his or her personal standard of taste. This is hardly a matter of accountability.

Certain professions, then, seem to share the term "accountable behavior" more than other professions. If my argument is correct, we find it easier to hold soldiers, policemen, politicians and scientists accountable, although there is an element of responsibility in each of these professions. But the term "accountable" does not make as much sense when applied to other professions; mother, artist, and yes, teacher. In the policeman, soldier, politician and scientist paradigm, accountability interferes with responsibility, for a system of external sanctions with subsequent punishment for violation is developed. The individual is primarily concerned with specifying correct procedure or proper behavior; one's personal responsibility is a secondary concern, if it matters at all.

It is interesting to note that procedure has been elevated to a place once occupied by morality. Witness the importance of proper procedure in jury cases, police reports and credit applications. Notice also the importance of procedure in the school. Students receive the same treatment for violating procedure as for cheating on an examination. The advent of accountability helps give procedure this prestige, for being accountable is largely a matter of following correct procedures. If teachers were to be held accountable,

this would also interfere with their responsibility. The teacher who wants to be told what to do would benefit; the creative teacher would not. Lastly, strict accountability leads to a repressive environment, and it encourages deceit and lying. Teachers teach for tests, and employees in loan companies must initiate a certain number of loans a day, for example.

Accountability is both a means and an attitude. The method is one of constant surveillance, and the attitude is one of doing the minimum. How is one's personal responsibility developed in such an environment? In the final analysis, accountability is a political method for ensuring complying behavior. If individuals are left responsible some of them will act irresponsibly. But if individuals are held strictly accountable, they can act irresponsibly in order to meet the demands of accountability. In fact, accountability encourages irresponsibility, for the individual is not called upon to make choices. Accountability and responsibility are opposing concepts.

Thus, teachers must be encouraged to exercise responsibility. Some teachers will not do so, and there will be evident confusion and even harm done to the students. This is the chance we take for an open society. Teachers could be evaluated by their peers, if need be. But even this evaluation should be minimal; otherwise, the same rigid system could develop which would be difficult to distinguish from accountability. The point is clear: teachers should be encouraged to act responsibly; if there is any external control, it should come from the teachers themselves. If teachers are <u>under</u> a system of accountability, it will detract from their dhance to act responsibly. If teachers act responsibly, there is no reason to develop a system of accountability.

One such method for developing teacher responsibility is suggested in the book Supporting the Learning Teacher, edited by Marilyn Hapgood and Stephen K. Bailey. Part of the book is concerned with the development of teacher centers to aid in the self-improvement and responsibility of teachers. Teacher centers are:

> just what the term implies: local facilities and self-improvement programs organized and run by the teachers themselves for purposes of upgrading educational performance[4].

The rationale for teacher centers consists of the following:

> (1) Fundamental educational reform will come only through those charged with the basic educational responsibility: to wit, the teachers; (2) teachers are unlikely to change their ways of doing things just because imperious, theoretical reformers . . . tell them to shape up; (3) teachers will take reform seriously only when they are responsible for defining their own educational problems, delineating their own needs, and receiving help on their own terms and turf.[5]

This notion of teacher centers was developed in Great Britain, and further research into this manner of developing teacher responsibility, as opposed to a system of accountability, would seem to be a step in the right direction.

References

1. Stanley Elam, "Performance-Based Teacher Education: What is the State of the Art?" American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, December, 1971.

2. I am grateful to Dr. Arthur Brown, Wayne State University, for this example. I would also like to thank Dr. Brown for his many enlightening discussions on this issue.

3. Robert Paul Craig, "Accountability Isn't Responsibility." Teacher's Voice, November 10, 1975.

4. Marilyn Hapgood and Stephen K. Bailey, Supporting the Learning Teacher. (New York: Agathon Press, 1975), p. 18.

5. Ibid. p. 23.

DEWEY'S THEORY OF INQUIRY REVISITED: THE BAIN CONNECTION

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Max Fisch, in his essay for Dewey's ninetieth birthday, notes the influence of the ideas of Alexander Bain on the development of Pragmatism.[1] In describing the climate of opinion that existed during what he calls the "Classic Period of American Philosophy," (roughly, just after the Civil War up to the eve of World War II) he identifies the idea of evolution as the dominant theme. Surprisingly, at least initially to this writer, he puts the works of Bain (The Senses and the Intellect, 1855, and The Emotions and the Will, 1859), particularly his theory of belief as expressed in the latter work, alongside the work of Darwin as one of the major influences of the time:

> Bain's theory was developed quite independently of Darwin's theory of evolution and was published in the same year. The early pragmatists promptly put the two together - Bain's theory of spontaneous or primitive credulity was suggestive of the exuberant overproduction of nature. The role of experience as confirmation or disconfirmation, not origination, was suggestive of the process of natural selection and survival of the fittest. Darwin's theory and Bain's were twinborn naturalistic variations on the old theme that man proposes and God disposes.[2]

That Bain's theory of belief had a profound influence on the development of pragmatic thought is widely known.[3] It is also well known that Dewey participated intimately in the elucidation of this position through his writings as well as through his personal contacts with James and Peirce, his logic teacher at Johns Hopkins, and with Royce, himself a former student at Johns Hopkins.[4] What is not well known is what direct influence the works of Bain had on the developing John Dewey.

What I propose to do, in what follows, is three-fold: (1) To extend the indirect influence hypothesis a few steps further; (2) To take a look at

Dewey's explicit references to Bain's works in the hope of getting a better estimate of the extent of his familiarity with these; and (3) By juxtaposing Bain's and Dewey's remarks on activity, ends and means, belief, and experience, attempt to determine the extent of correspondence of their ideas relevant to the main themes underlying Dewey's "Theory of Inquiry."

The Bain Connection

To carry the indirect influence inference a bit further, Robinson, in his preface to The Emotions and the Will (in the Significant Contributions to the History of Psychology) identifies Bain's two major works, The Senses and the Intellect and The Emotions and the Will as "the major texts in psychology in the English speaking world until James's Principles."[5] He goes on to say, "It certainly would be fair to say that no important psychologist from 1880 to 1920 could safely ignore Bain's work."[6] He concludes his general assessment of Bain's importance, not only to that epoch in psychology but to our own, by stating:

> We are, in one respect or another, all disciples of Bain to the extent that we are products of our immediate predecessors and they of theirs. For a half century, Bain's volumes were psychology in the English-speaking world . . . Before Bain, all was philosophy, or very nearly so. And after Bain, the competition was stiff.[7]

The time has come to break the suspense by asking whether Dewey was, as a matter of fact, familiar with Bain's works. The answer, as some of you may know, is emphatically in the affirmative. The Carbondale and Edwardsville collections present clear evidence of such familiarity.[8] Dewey mentions Bain by name in no fewer than seventeen references. Several of these involve extensive quotations, and the works cited include not only The Senses and the

Intellect and The Emotions and the Will, but two of Bain's other major works, Moral Science and Mind and Body.[9] The wide range of topics of reference include the Realism/Idealism debate,[10] on locating the psychical in the physical,[11] the notion of "primitive credulity,"[12] a theory of obligation,[13] Utilitarianism,[14] the deliberation process,[15] happiness and conduct,[16] basing psychology on biological method,[17] a conception of thought and action,[18] and on reducing "tender emotions" to sensations of contact.[19] Considering Bain's eminence during the time, and given such a wide range of references over a large part of his most productive years, there can be little question that Dewey was more than conversant with Bain's ideas.

The list of reference topics is notable, however, not only for its breadth but for its curious omissions. One would surely expect the precursor of Deweyian thought to have dealt significantly with concepts such as activity, ends and means, belief, and experience. What makes the omissions curious is that Bain dealt extensively with each of these. As a matter of fact, all four of these concepts are central to his, as well as Dewey's, psychology. The rough diagram of this begins with a sort of primordial activity interrupted by some obstacle or difficulty eventuating in desire or end-wish culminating in belief (a willingness to act); and all of this taken together constitutes an experience. All four concepts keep bobbing up like logs on the mill pond in both writers' works. This needs little elaboration in Dewey, for the Deweyian scholar. Some examples from both writers will, however, help to extend the point. I shall take them up in order: activity, ends and means, belief, and experience.

Activity

Bain prefaces both emotional and rational development on spontaneous movement. In his two part work The Emotions and the Will he summarizes the position most succinctly in the opening sections of the second part:

> It is there [Book I. Chapter I) laid down, 'that movement precedes sensation, and is at the outset independent of any stimulus from without; and that activity is a more intimate and inseparable property of our constitution than any of our sensations, and, in fact, enters as a component part into every one of the senses . . . .'[20]

Following a series of proofs he goes on to say, "Spontaneity, in fact, is the response of the system to nutrition - - an effusion of power of which the food is the stimulant."[21] And,

> We must recognize central energy or act and permanent property of th to exist, we are at liberty to suppose that it may show itself in a variety of ways.[22]

And, further,

> What I mean to affirm, therefore, with is that, taking the different groups of moving members, these begin to play of their own accord, and continue in action so long as the central stimulus is unexhausted, or until a new direction is given to it.[23]

One cannot but think of Dewey's analysis of desire, i.e. as in Theory of Valuation, where he says,

> When . . . desires are seen to arise only within certain existential contexts (namely, those in which some lack prevents the immediate execution of an active tendency) and when they are seen to function in reference to these in contexts in such a way as to make good the existing want between desire and . . . valuation.[24]

And, more emphatically, regarding man's active nature, he states, "It is absurd to ask what induces a man to activity generally speaking. He is an active being and that is all there is to be said on that score."[25]

For both Bain and Dewey the starting point was activity. This cannot be emphasized too strongly. An understanding of the mainstream of either

thinker's works depends significantly on keeping this before one's mind. I shall return to this point later on.

Ends and Means

I begin with a quote: "In the complete development of coluntary power, the ends in view are often means to farther ends, and pursuit of the one is sustained by the impulse de audience to identify the author of these remarks? Let me make it more interesting by stating that they were written prior to 1859 (the year of Dewey's birth)! These are the words of Bain from a section of The Emotions and the Will entitled "Intermediate Actions and Associated Ends."[27]

In Dewey's works the "end-in-view" as means to farther ends is a recurrent theme. It is, as a matter of fact, at the root of his instrumentalism. The following brief quotations from three of his works illustrate the point:

From Logic:

> Only recognition in both theory and practice that ends to be attained (ends-in-view) are of the nature of hypotheses and that hypotheses have to be formed and tested in strict correlativity with existential conditions as means, can alter current habits of dealing with social issues.[28]

From Essays in Experimental Logic:

> In other words, the last end-in-view is always that which operates as the direct or immediate means of setting our own powers in operation. The end-in-view upon which judgement of action settles down is simply the adequate or complete means to the doing of something.[29]

From Theory of Valuation: "Ends-in-view, as distinct from ends as accomplished results, themselves function as directive means; or in ordinary language, as plans."[30] No further comment should be needed in this regard.

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Belief

One cannot but hesitate a moment when introducing such a volatile subject. Historically, from Plato right up to our time, most philosophers of note have taken a crack at 'belief.' In a sense it's like rolling out one of the big guns, i.e. logic or truth or meaning. Fortunately, my task here is exegetical rather than analytical, thus I can allow myself to breathe more deeply and proceed along the way.

Bain devotes a full chapter of The emotions and the Will to an exposition of 'belief.'[31] The chapter is also noteworthy for its explicit reference to "experience" and in its strongly empiricist tone, both of which we shall return to shortly.

Let us now compare some of Bain's and Dewey's pronouncements on 'belief.' Bain begins the chapter boldly:

> It will be readily admitted that the state of mind called Belief is, in many cases, a concomitant of our activity. But I mean to go farther than this, and to affirm that belief has no meaning except in ference to our actions. . . .[32]

A bit later on he says:

> The primodial form of belief is expectation of some contingent future about to follow on our actions. Wherever any creature is found performing an action, indifferent in itself, with a view to some end . . . we say that the animal possesses confidence or believ. . . .[33]

He then goes on to say, "While, therefore, action is the basis, and ultimate criterion, or belief . . . ."[34]

Bain opposes belief with doubt or uncertainty. He says for example, "The real opposite of belief as a state of mind is not disbelief,but doubt, uncertainty . . . ."[35]

With respect to confidence or beliefs, he says:

> The foremost rank, among our Intuitive tendencies involved in belief, is to be assigned to the natural trust that we have in the continuance of the present state of things, or the disposition to go on acting as we have once begun.[36]

Finally, it would seem that he was aware of an ambiguity in the use of the concept. In a comparatively brief reference he distinguishes between the "feeling" sense and the "experiential" sense:

> Faith, in the religious sense, is mainly supplied from the fountains of human feeling . . . Direct experience can have but little to do with the subject matter of spiritual essences . . ..
>
> As in other things, the belief here also may refer to the side of evil . . . The terms 'faith' and 'believer,' are commonly used to express the comforting aspect of religion . . ..[37]

A single passage from Dewey's Logic will be sufficient to show the correspondence of views:

> If inquiry begins in doubt, it terminates in the institution of conditions which remove the need for doubt. The latter state of affairs may be designated by the words <u>belief</u> and <u>knowledge</u>. For reasons that I shall state later I prefer the words "warranted assertability."
>
> <u>Belief</u> may be so understood as to be a fitting designation for the outcome of inquiry. Doubt is uneasy; it is tension that finds expression and outlet in the processes of inquiry. Inquiry terminates in reaching that which is settled. This settled condition is the demarcating characteristic of genuine belief. In so far belief is an appropriate name for the end of inquiry. But belief is a "double-barreled" word. It is used objectively to name <u>what</u> is believed. In this sense, the outcome of inquiry is a settled objective state of affairs, so settled that we are ready to act upon it, overtly or in imagination. <u>Belief</u> here names the settled condition of objective subject matter, together with readiness to act in a given way when, if, and as, that subject matter is present in existence. But in popular usage, <u>belief</u> also means a personal matter; something that some human being entertains or holds; a position, which under the influence of psychology, is converted into the notion that belief is merely a mental or psychical state.[38]

Thus, in both cases, we find action or the disposition to act as the criterion of belief. We also find belief contrasted with doubt, and recognition of the at least "double barreled" ambiguity of the concept.

Experience

In his treatment of 'belief' Bain identified three sources: Intuitive or Instinctive; Experience; and the Emotions. Generally speaking, of the three, emotion emerges as clearly the least reliable source. He says, for example:

> Any strong feeling possessing the mind, gives such a determination to the thoughts and the active impulses as to pervert the convictions, and dispose us to trust or distrust at that moment things we should not trust or distrust at another time.[39]

And, later, in an even more negative tone, he says, "Emotion tampers with the intellectual trains, as a culprit would fain do with a witness in his case, keeping out of the way all that are adverse to the interest of the moment."[40]

It is in the contrast between the Intuitive or Instinctive and Experience sources that we get a good picture of what Bain had in mind by 'experience.' What we find is that one (the intuitive) leads into the other (experience). In a sense, experience becomes the "corrector" of the intuitive. The intuitive provides the "primitive impulse" or "active element" necessary for belief and then experience, the "intellectual property," modifies or reshapes it. Bain refers to this outcome as "sound belief:" "Sound belief, instead of being a pacific and gentle growth, is in reality the battering of a series of strongholds, the conquering of a country in hostile occupation."[41] And at another point he says, "The legitimate cause is to let experience be the corrector of the primitive impulses; to take warning by every failure, and to recognize no other canon of validity."[42] And, finally, with respect to the correction:

> It is part of the intuitive tendencies of the mind to generalize in this way; but these tendencies being as often wrong as right, have no validity in themselves; and the real authority is experience. The long series of trials made since the beginning of observation has shown how far such inferences can safely be carried; and we are now in possession of a body

> of rules, in harmony with the course of nature, for guiding us in carrying on these operations.[43]

In a most notable lengthy footnote to this passage Bain goes on to say that it is not in the province of this work for him to "deal with the entire subject matter of scientific method and proof."

What seems clear from all of this is that what Bain has in mind by "Experience" is scientific method, or something akin to it.

I alluded earlier to the "strongly empiricist tone" of Bain's chapter on 'belief.' What makes the lengthy footnote so notable is not only his explicit reference to "scientific method" but the apparent struggle he is going through to acknowledge or accept his own empiricist (or experimentalist) tendencies. The concluding statement indicates quite clearly how far he had progressed along that path:

> Everybody admits that our only practical safety in the operations of life, lies in our close adherence to what we find when we make the experiment; and surely this circumstance ought to give experience an exclusive place in our estimation as the cannon of credibility.[44]

As a preface to the treatment of Dewey on 'experience' let me assure the audience that I have no intention of launching into a fullblown examination of what he had to say on the subject. I would refer those who are interested in a more extensive treatment to Appendix 2 of John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925-1953 for a lengthy and most enlightening discussion of the difficulties with the concept.[45]

What emerges in our traversing of the terrain of action, ends and means, belief, and now experience, is a unity. We find, for example, that doubt arises out of an interruption of activity, an end-wish or end-in-view emerges and leads toward belief that we are once again willing to proceed along or act

upon. It is as if the wheel had turned full circle. Without having to quibble about the meaning of 'experience' in its variety of usages, I think we can safely say that it was to this process, to this unity, that Dewey referred when he used the expression an experience. This usage is nowhere more explicit than in Chapter III of Art As Experience, entitled "Having An Experience." Let me quote briefly from these passages:

> In contrast to such [inchoate] experience, we have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences. A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a situation . . . is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience.[46]

And then he states, "Philosophers, even empirical philosophers, have spoken for the most part of experience at large. Idiomatic speech, however, refers to experiences each of which is singular, having its own beginning and end."[47] And, finally,

> THERE are . . . common patterns in various experiences no matter how unlike they are to one another in the details of their subject matter . . . The outline of the common pattern is set by the fact that every experience is the result of interaction between a live creature and some aspect of the world in which he lives.[48]

This last pronouncement is a clear statement of what I take to be the dominant underlying theme of a great part, if not most, of the writings of both Dewey and Bain. In its simplist form, i.e. action → encounter (with the world) → change, it represents the underlying psychology of Pragmatism. As it is elaborated in Bain it becomes a theory of belief, accepted intact in pragmatic thought. In Dewey it evolves into "The Pattern of Inquiry" of our practical as well as theoretical activities.[49] And finally, in Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, it becomes the fully

elaborated method of science. Perhaps this is what Max Fisch had in mind when, commenting on a Peirce statement, he says, "From this first pragmatic pronouncement, with its fusion of Darwin and Bain, there is a continuous stream of tendency . . . which issued eventually in Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry."[50]

Summary

What I have tried to show in this essay is that Dewey not only lived and worked in the shadow of Bain's ideas, but that he was familar with Bain's most important works; and further, that the major theme of his (Dewey's) writings bears a marked correspondence to a major theme of Bain's writings.

Addendum

What I have done here is only a small beginning. I can see the possibility of a number of theses emanating from the Bain - Dewey connection. Among them might be an in-depth analysis of their convergences and divergences on a number of issues, i.e. the relationship of naturalistic psychology to philosophy; on resolving man's egocentric predicament; and on the nature and limits of scientific method. Another area, to my knowledge completely untapped, would be a comparison of educational theories. Increasingly, in his later writings Bain turned to pedagogy. One of his major works, Education As A Science, was published in 1902, two years before his death.[51] And finally, what I have left undone, is the attempt to reinterpret Dewey's "Pattern of Inquiry" based on the insights provided in the

main part of this essay. There has, for example, been a tendency to begin with the "indeterminant situation" as the antecedent condition of inquiry. A clearer picture of the entire process emerges when one begins the account with the "biological antecedent conditions of an unsettled situation," as Dewey referred to it.[52] It is most notably to these conditions that Bain calls our attention. The implications of this for education are, I think, considerable. But that must wait for another day.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Max H. Fisch, "Dewey's Place in the Classic Period of American Philosophy," in Essays for John Dewey's Ninetieth Birthday, Edited by Kenneth D. Benne and William O. Stayley, (Urban, Illinois: Bureau of Research and Services, College of Education, University of Illinois, 1950), particularly pp. 13-17.

[2]Ibid. p. 14.

[3]Cf. Philip P. Weiner, "Peirce's Metaphysical Club and the Genesis of Pragmatism," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VII (1946), pp. 218-233; and Thomas A. Gorge, The Thought of C. S. Peirce (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969), particularly p. 12 and p. 331.

[4]George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), pp. 28-43.

[5]Daniel N. Robinson, (ed), Significant Contributions to the History of Psychology, (Series A, Orientations, Volume V, A. Baiu) (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1977), p. xxi.

[6]Ibid., p. xxxvii.

[7]Ibid., p. xxxvii.

[8]These Volumes represent the most comprehensive collection of Dewey's works in print today. There are in all sixteen volumes, five representing his early works (1882-1898), ten representing his middle works (1889-1924), and one (as of 1981) representing his later works (1925-1953). The publisher is the Southern Illinois University Press. The editorial board for the early works consisted of George E. Axtelle, JoAnn Boydston, Joe R. Burnett, S. Morris Eames, Lewis E. Hahn, Wayne A. R. Leys, William R. McKenzie, and Francis T. Villemain. The middle and later works were edited by JoAnn Boydston. I shall abbreviate them in what follows as follows: E.W. for Early Works; M.W. for Middle Works; and L.W. for Later Works.

[9]The Senses and the Intellect, E.W., Vol. 1, p. 133; The Emotions and the Will, E.W., Vol. 3, p. 329; Mind and Body, E.W., Vol. 1, p. 110; and Moral Science, E.W., Vol. 4, p. 331.

[10]E.W., Vol. 1, pp. 132-134; M.W., Vol. 6, p. 93; and M.W., Vol. 10, p. 108.

[11]E.W., Vol. 1, p. 110.

[12]E.W., Vol. 2, p. 85.

[13]E.W., Vol. 2, pp. 328-333; E.W., Vol. 4, pp. 330-335; and M.W., Vol. 5, pp. 320-323.

[14]M.W., Vol. 2, p. 55; M.W., Vol. 5, p. 261; and M.W., Vol. 5, p. 388.

[15]M.W., Vol. 3, p. 139.

[16]M.W., Vol. 5, p. 242.

[17]M.W., Vol. 6, p. 93.

[18]M.W., Vol. 10, p. 108.

[19]L.W., Vol. 1, p. 158.

[20]Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will (London: John W. Parker and Son, West Strand, 1858), pp. 327-328.

[21]Ibid., p. 328.

[22]Ibid., p. 329.

[23]Ibid., pp. 329-330.

[24]John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 16.

[25]John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Randon House, 1930), p. 119.

[26]Bain, Op. Cit., p. 373.

[27]Bain, Ibid., p. 373.

[28]John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), p. 497.

[29]John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1953), p. 372.

[30]Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 53.

[31]Bain, Op. Cit., pp. 568-598.

[32]Ibid., p. 568.

[33]Ibid., p. 569.

[34]Ibid., p. 570.

[35]Ibid., p. 574.

[36]Ibid., p. 580.

[37]Ibid., p. 594.

[38]Dewey, Op. Cit., Logic. p. 7.

[39]Bain, Op. Cit., p. 587.

[40]Ibid., p. 589.

[41]Ibid., p. 583.

[42]Ibid., p. 586.

[43]Ibid., p. 586.

[44]Ibid., p. 587.

[45]L.W., Vol. 1, pp. 369-392.

[46]John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1958), p. 35.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ibid., pp. 43-44.

[49]Dewey, Op. Cit., Logic. pp. 101-119.

[50]Fisch, Op. Cit., p. 17

[51]Alexander Bain, Education As A Science (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1902).

[52]Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 106.

JOHN DEWEY ON WAR AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

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"Philosophy recovers itself when it turns from the problems of philosophers and deals with the problems of men." This conviction, expressed by John Dewey in Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), inspired his work over the course of many decades--but no activities of his long life more vividly illustrate the force of that principle than his engagement in international politics during the years 1923-24. War, and whether the League of Nations was an appropriate instrument to prevent war, were matters very much on his mind during those years, as they were on the minds of many thoughtful Americans.

I propose now to look back upon the events and arguments of those years. My enterprise is philosophical in that any enrichment of our understanding of a great philosopher must help us in evaluating his principles and in formulating our own. But my enterprise is as much historical as philosophical. I want to illuminate a little-remembered chapter of American intellectual history by reconsidering, for a while, a notable set of persons, events, and arguments. The persons and events of our own day are very different, of course; but in the arguments of sixty years ago there may be a good deal from which we can learn and be guided.

As a prelude, a brief word about Dewey at this time. He was then in his early sixties, already world-renowned, but with more than thirty years of creative scholarship lying before him. The two year period of which I speak was productive for him, even prolific, but his writing was not then taking the form of big books. Human Nature and Conduct and Reconstruction in Philosophy had been published only a few years before. Experience and Nature, The Quest

for Certainty, and Art as Experience all lie just a few years ahead. The early nineteen twenties were for him a period of more concrete and more politicized battle. It is a period that finds him in fighting trim, applying his practical idealism to a host of earthy questions.

Issues in education were among these earthy concerns--although I do not propose to enter them here. In 1924 Dewey went for a two-month visit to Turkey, as a guest of the new Turkish government, to examine the school system there, and make recommendations regarding its improvement. His report to the Turkish government, "Report and Recommendation upon Turkish Education," is a remarkable document. It is a lucid, punchy, in places a brilliant treatment of the difficulties of a system of public education in newly developing countries. That report had been totally lost; it was re-found (in Turkey) in 1960, and will appear in Volume 15 of The Middle Works of John Dewey, soon to be published by the Southern Illinois University Press. I warmly recommend it.

What I aim to do here may be divided into three short chapters. In chapter one, I will briefly review the context of the arguments of 1923-24 about war and the League. In chapter two I will identify and characterize the chief participants in the arguments in which Dewey was a protagonist. In chapter three I will summarize the principal arguments of Dewey and of his opponents in this sphere. My object is neither to defend Dewey, nor to attack him. I hope to help his position at that time to be understood. He was, as you probably know, a vigorous opponent of American membership in the League of Nations.

Chapter One: The Context

War, and its prevention, was Dewey's most consuming interest during the years 1923-24. He had become convinced that progress toward this great end, preventing war, would be possible only through a profound change, a reversal, of the attitudes toward war commonly taken by citizens and statesmen alike. [Dewey would have approved warmly, I think, of a button I saw being distributed at the Ann Arbor Art Fair during the summer of 1982. It read simply: Think Peace.] Dewey became, in these years, the foremost spokesman for a new movement, the movement to outlaw war.

Dewey's opening salvo in this campaign, an essay entitled "Ethics and International Relations," appeared in Foreign Affairs in March of 1923. The problem, as he saw it then, was to find a way in which to make genuinely moral judgments effective in affairs among nations. "War is as stupid as you please," he wrote--but why does it persist? What factors interfere with the operation of moral habits and moral ideas in this most critical sphere? In domestic affairs we continually reexamine our laws and regulations; we see a constant ferment of legislation in which new ideas are tried, old ways criticized, plans made and re-made. But in the international sphere, by contrast, little or none of this is done. Nations act as they have always acted, as though the codes of international relations were utterly impervious to change. Laws--functioning not as abstract absolutes but as social hypotheses put to work in concrete contexts--are remarkably and painfully absent in the international sphere. The remedy for this gross defect, Dewey thought, was the extension of the strength of jurisprudence from the smaller to the larger frame. That task he believed worthy of his best energies, and he gave those energies unstintingly.

The strategy and tactics of Dewey's campaign can be fully understood only in view of two continuing states of affairs, one private, the other public. The private background is formed in good measure by Dewey's sustained correspondence with Salmon O. Levinson, a successful Chicago attorney, devoted public servant, organizer and chairman of the American Committee to Outlaw War. The exchange of letters with Levinson proved an energizing force. Levinson lacked Dewey's philosophical depth, acumen, and intellectual resources--but he was untiring, and supremely dedicated to the cause. His letters were a fountainhead of political analysis, tactical suggestions--and above all, of encouragement. Dewey's letters are mostly brief; his energies go instead into public debate. Levinson stimulates his writing, praises it, uses it, working like a Dervish in every political circle to which he can gain entry to advance the movement to outlaw war. "Your last article," Levinson writes Dewey, "is always your best." And in another letter, "I cannot tell you how wonderful is your support for the great cause of my life." Often bed-ridden and in pain, Levinson gives support and stimulation to Dewey, who had his hands full in the public arena.

In that public arena the atmosphere was highly charged. The outlawry of war was but one of three movements competing for the attention of the American public. Congress and the President were subjected to conflicting pressures--all from advocates honorably aiming for permanent peace. The upshot was a confusing tangle of argument.

1. The League of Nations was by this date a well-established reality. Successful opposition to America's joining the League had been led by Senators Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and William Borah of Idaho. The

issue was far from dead, however. Very strong voices were at this time urging American membership in the League. More of them shortly.

2. The Permanent Court of International Justice, associated with the League of Nations in genesis, but largely distinct from it in operation, was the second competitor. Participation by the United States in the work of that Court was implored by some, condemned by others. To Court membership, as to League membership, Dewey had strong objections.

3. The League and the Court were believed by Dewey and his associates to be inconsistent with the Outlawry of War, and this was, for him, one strong argument against them. The nature of this inconsistency (or its unreality, which his critics alleged) is the heart of the heated debate that ensued.

I will explain and comment briefly upon that debate below. Before doing so it will be helpful to be reminded of the leading protagonists.

Chapter Two: The Cast of Characters

On each of the two opposing sides the leading advocates were three in number. For the outlawry of war, and against the League and the Court, were John Dewey and Salmon Levinson, as we have seen. With them was the striking and influential Republican Senator from Idaho, William Borah, whose adamant struggle to keep the United States out of the League had given him the name of isolationist. It was Borah, nevertheless, who was principal sponsor for Senate Resolution #441 (introduced 14 February 1922) which, if adopted, would have put the weight of the American Congress behind the outlawry of war. The Borah plan had three parts:

a) A universal treaty making war "a public crime under the law of nations" and "a solemn agreement or treaty to bind" every nation "to indict and punish its own international war breeders or instigators and war profiteers;"

b) The creation of "a code of international law of peace based upon equality and justice between nations, amplified and expanded and adapted and brought down to date;"

and, c) The creation of "a judicial substitute for war...in the form or nature of an international court, modeled on our Federal Supreme Court in its jurisdiction over controversies between our sovereign states, such court to possess affirmative jurisdiction to hear and decide all purely international controversies as defined by the code, or arising under treaties."

Some such plan, its particulars no doubt adjusted through international conference and negotiation, was seen by its advocates to be by far the most radical of the three possible steps. Senator Borah was thought an unlikely ally in this enterprise, in view of his past fears of infringement upon American sovereignty by the League--yet ally he was. Defenders of the League believed Borah's change of heart suspect; some did not think for a moment that he or his constituency would ever really support an international treaty that would bind the United States to do what his own resolution called for. Dewey's integrity was not in question; but it was widely thought that Borah now professed support for Dewey's movement chiefly because its (claimed) inconsistency with the League of Nations gave a useful weapon in opposing American entry into the League.

Supporting that entry in these debates were many powerful figures, of whom perhaps the most sophisticated was Walter Lippmann, a moral philosopher as well as political analyst of high repute. Lippmann's 1923 essay in The Atlantic Monthly, "The Outlawry of War," was a scathing attack on Dewey's movement; it provoked two of Dewey's best efforts on the other side: "What Outlawry of War is Not" and "War and a Code of Laws" both appearing in October of 1923, in The New Republic. In the Dewey-Levinson correspondence, that Lippmann essay is discussed at length. Levinson, who personally financed the reproduction and distribution of Dewey's New Republic essays by the scores of thousands, entertained the possibility of reproducing the Lippmann-Dewey exchange as a set, believing that Dewey's demolition of Lippmann's criticisms would thus prove most effective. They decided not to do this, however, because the presence of Lippmann's detailed analyses might "confuse" the readers. That decision was at least tactically wise; Lippmann's attacks on the Outlawry movement were very sharply put, and certainly not without merit.

Although the pro-League forces were supported by many other very distinguished persons (among them Chief Justice Taft, and university presidents Elliot and Lowell) the thorniest of the three advocates with whom Dewey had to deal was the philosopher, Arthur O. Lovejoy. He presented a case squarely meeting Dewey's opposition to the League (in "Shall we Join the League of Nations?", a New Republic essay of March, 1923) obliging Dewey to respond in the same periodical with a lengthy letter of rebuttal.

The third of Dewey's opponents in this sphere was Manley O. Hudson, whose persistent advocacy of American membership in the Permanent Court of International Justice was quite masterful. Dewey met Hudson in a great debate

in Boston, at the Unitarian Layman's League, in May of 1923. Nowhere are the issues more cogently joined than in this debate, whose contents were published later that year in The Christian Century.

Chapter Three: The Arguments

I cannot do full justice, in short compass, to the issues presented by the two sides. The arguments for joining the League and the Court are readily grasped. The arguments against--Dewey's, at least--are more subtle. Focusing upon his concerns will help to reveal the connections between Dewey's partisan positions and his larger principles.

The League of Nations was viewed by many as the most progressive and hopeful step possible for all nations, the United States being no exception. The case for joining is put most succinctly by Arthur Lovejoy, who compresses the major issues into what he calls "three entirely definite and searchingly practical questions:

"Does the existence of the League have, or can it be made to have, any appreciable tendency to diminish the likelihood of war in Europe?

"Would America's participation in the League strengthen such a tendency?

"If so, would this advantage be more than offset by incidental dangers to interests more important...than European peace? [Lovejoy, "Shall We Join the League of Nations?" p. 138] The pro-League advocates were not romantics; they saw that joining would have some negative aspects; they realized that the imperfections and limitations of the League obliged one to consider the matter as one of relative advantage and disadvantage. On

balance, however, they believed the gains to outweigh the losses markedly. The League, they thought, could make international affairs somewhat healthier, somewhat more stable, and it would therefore at least reduce the danger of war. So the answer to the first question (for them) was yes. America's participation would assist in that enterprise (they thought)--and if that were true, there could be no incidental disadvantages that would counterbalance such great merits. This was the pro-League position in a nutshell.

Some of those in the anti-League party were outright isolationists, wanting no entanglements with European politics, and tolerating no reduction of American sovereignty over her own affairs. This was not Dewey's view.

On what, then did he base his objections? His opposition to League membership had two parts. First, he did not believe that American participation in the League would reduce the danger of war; it might in fact increase that danger. Why? Because the League as it then stood (1923) was (in Dewey's words) a "farce" in view of its exclusion of Russia and Germany; it was being manipulated by other major powers (France, chiefly) to serve their selfish interests. It was not a league of <u>nations</u> we were being asked to join, Dewey argued, but a league of governments, governments whose policies had brought on the World War, and who "have no wish to change their policies." [Dewey, "Shall we Join the League of Nations?" letter of reply, p. 37]

Moreover, Dewey contended, the argument for "international cooperation" which has such enormous appeal, was in this context a fraud. It was an emotional argument, having no anchorage in empirical fact. He writes: "But cooperation with whom and for what?...International cooperation is hardly

possible unless there is something international with which to cooperate. What is it and where is it?" [D/SWJTL, p.37]

The force of these questions can only be appreciated in light of the bitter arguments, then in progress, over the Treaty of Versailles, a treaty that had imposed very heavy reparation payments on Germany, and which was believed, by Dewey and many others in the United States and Great Britain, to be not only unjust but likely to foment greater hate and more war. These conflicts over the reduction of reparation payments--Dewey thought them fundamental--were splitting the League. The French were claiming that the British-proposed reductions exhibited the desire to break the Treaty of Versailles. Dewey was urging modifications of that Treaty going yet further than the British proposals. In this typical political maelstrom, what purpose would be served by our joining? Would our alignment with either one of these parties truly serve the cause of peace?

Reducing the likelihood of war, Dewey argued, required our thinking through, carefully and rationally, our long-term course as a Nation. To enter the League without having done that would be, he said, nothing but a "repetition of what happened when we plunged into the war without having first come to an understanding with our associates, only to find in the end our hands tied in the execution of our own policies by conflicting European policies in general, and secret agreements in particular." [Ibid, p. 37)

This first part of Dewey's position, in sum, was a thoughtful defense of negative answers to Lovejoy's first two questions. No, the League does not seem likely to reduce the danger of war; and no, America's participation in it almost certainly would not do that either.

But Dewey's greatest objection to the League of Nations stemmed from his answer to Lovejoy's third question. What other disadvantages would our joining the League entail? It would, he thought, force us to abandon the one course of conduct that did have at least a chance of reducing or eliminating the danger of war. The course (mentioned earlier) was an international movement to outlaw war. The League blocked that course because it was committed to the age-old geopolitical maneuvering that has always bred war, and will continue to do so. French armies, in 1922, had invaded the German Ruhr; the League had looked the other way. Atrocities in Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East had met with a totally ineffectual response from the League. The iniquities (not merely inequities) of the Treaty of Versailles had been affirmed by the League. In general and in particular the League was root and branch the old way of dealing with international dispute--threaten and promise, and then resort to arms. Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose!

The battle over the Permanent Court of International Justice was not as bitter, and not paramount. But on this matter also Dewey took what we might think to be a retrogressive, apparently isolationist, position--again for reasons of a deep and philosophical sort. With the Court as with the League the problem was essentially that it was tied (be believed) to a corrupt system of international relations, and thus committed to that system. In joining it, therefore, we would keep ourselves from doing what really had to be done.

This requires brief explanation. The worth of a court, Dewey insisted, depends entirely upon the laws that court is authorized to interpret and enforce. This Court, at the Hague, was an instrument of the League; it was

committed to the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles. It was more of the same old poison. Dewey wrote: [Dewey: "Should the US Join the World Court?" p. 84]

"I believe the fallacy which most paralyzes human effort today is the idea that progress can take place by more steps in the old wrong direction... If there be somewhere some grinning devil that watches the blundering activities of man, I can imagine nothing that gives him more malicious satisfaction than to see earnest and devoted man and women taking steps, by improving a legal and political system that is committed to war, to do away with war."

Dewey's opposition to the League and the Court--however unwise you and I may judge it in retrospect--was surely based on the most forward-looking principles. I conclude these philosophico-historical reflections by summarizing those positive principles on which Dewey hoped action would be taken. You may conclude, upon hearing them, that he was relying too heavily upon words as replacements for deeds. After all, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, signed by the United States and some 26 other nations, did outlaw war, not very effectively. You may conclude that he was not being realistic. He, in turn, might have joined C. Wright Mills and his later followers in finding calculations of gain and loss in war to be nothing less than "crackpot realism." With great, perhaps incomprehensible catastrophe at our toetips, whose thinking about war is truly realistic?

The Outlawry of War (Dewey capitalizes the words) must be more than sentiment, more than words. War must not merely be thought criminal; it must be made concretely into a public crime by international law. A supreme court of international justice must indeed be established. But it must have

affirmative jurisdiction, unlike the Court at the Hague which could deal only with those nations who cared to come to it, and only those matters they cared to put before it. An effective court must decide matters pertaining to all nations whether one of the parties might will it or not; and it must be authorized by an international law that establishes all war as crime, and all war-makers as public criminals.

In the great debate with Manley Hudson over our joining the Court at the Hague, Dewey said, to an approving throng: "I hope you will not think that I have come here to oppose a proposition for a world court, or for America's share in it. I have come here to plead for a real world court, a supreme court to substitute judicial decisions for war as a method of settling disputes among nations...to settle disputes finally [emphasis in the original] whether they are between nations or individuals." The only path to the true settlement of disputes is that through law and the courts, he continues; without them violence and war will not be avoided. What he is putting forth, Dewey contends, is not the simplistic proposition that we abolish war with words. Rather, he defends "the much more fundamental proposition to abolish the war system as an authorized and legally sanctioned institution." To "abolish wars" is a utopian idea, or shallow sentiment. To abolish the war system requires concrete action which is feasible. [D/STUSJ:WC? p.77]

In this belief Dewey may have been unrealistic. But an isolationist, a political troglodyte, he was not. This outlawry of war, he thought, was "a new mode of approach, an attack from a different angle...Other schemes for peace have relied upon the initiative of rulers, politicians or statement." [p. 85]

I conclude now with his conclusion. Let us go to work on it, he says. Of course theoretical objections to the outlawry of war can be "heaped up from now to doomsday." That is true of every great change, of course. But if national leaders respond to the universal hunger for peace, these objections "will vanish like the morning dew before the morning sun." [p.85]

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